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Representation, Mandate, and Agency: A 
Kommentar on Louisiana's New Law 
Wendell H. Holmes· 
Symeon C. Symeonidest 
This Article is a presentation and constructive critique of Louisiana s new law of 
representation and mandate. The Article compares the provisions of the new law with the 
solutions developed by Louisiana jurispnulence as well as with the equivalent institutions of the 
Roman law, mndem continental civil law, and American common law. 
The Article concludes that, despite several shortcomings, the new law makes a 
significant contribution to modem civil law in general and to the law of mixed jurisdictions in 
particular. While being fo.ithfal to Louisiana s civilian heritage, the new law recognizes the 
realities of contemporary transactional practice and the need for some uniformity with the law 
of the surrounding common law states. To that end, the new law appropriately sanctions certain 
usefal commnn-law institutions, such as apparent authority and wrdisc/osed agency, and recasts 
them in tenns compatible wiJh a civil code. If only for this reason, the new Louisiana law is 
worthy of a careful examination by other civil-law or mixed jurisdictions that recognize the 
same needs. 
I. INTR.ODUCTION •··················•·········· ........••............... ...........•. ...... 1089 
II. REPRESENTATION AND PROCURATION .. . .................. ................. 1091 
A. Representation ............ . ....... ........... ...... .... ......................... 1 091 
1. A New Name for an Old Concept.. . ............ .... ....... 1091 
2. Legal Representation in Modem Civil Codes ....... 1 092 
3. Legal Representation in the French Code civil..  ... . 1095 
4. Legal Representation in Traditional Common 
Law ........................................................... ............... 1096 
5.  Legal Representation in the Old Louisiana 
Civil Code ........................... .............. ....................... 1098 
6. The Utility of the New Articles ............................... 1 1 01 
B. Procuration ......................................................... . . . .. ......... 1 103 
1 .  Confusion o f  Terms and Concepts in the Civil 
Code of 1 870 ............................................................ 1 1 03 
2. Confusion in the French Code civi/ ......................... 1 106 
• Liskow & Lewis Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center; 
B.A. Millsaps College; J.D. Tulane University School of Law. 
t Judge Albert Tate Professor of Law Emeritus, Louisiana State University Law 
Center; Dean and Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. LL.B. (Priv. 
L.), LL.B. (Publ. L.) Aristotelian University of Thessaloniki; LL.M., S.J.D. Harvard Law 
School. 
1 087 
1088 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1087 
3. Conceptual Differences Between Procuration 
and Mandate Under the New Act ...........................
. 1107 
4. Procuration Is a Unilateral Juridical Act.. . ..... ......... 1109 
5. Coexistence of Procuration and Mandate ....... . ....... 1111 
m. MANDATE ........................................................ ........................... 1112 
A. General Principles ..................... . .. . ... .......... ................... . .. 1112 
1. Mandate Is a Contract .. .............. .... .......... . ............... 1112 
2. Object of Mandate ................................................. ... 1113 
a. Mandate vs. Employment Contract ... ............. 1114 
b. Mandate vs. Contract for Services ..... . ............ 1115 
3. Undisclosed Mandate ...... .................. ....................... 1118 
4. Mandate vs. Agency .................. . ....... ............ .........
. 1118 
5. Applicability of Law of Obligations ....................... 1118 
6. futerest Served ....... ................... . .............. .. ............... 1119 
7. Onerous or Gratuitous Contract ... . .. ............... ......... 1121 
8. Form ......................................... ..... . ........................... 1122 
a. Form and "Equal Dignity" ... .......... ....... .......... 1122 
b. Application of the Rule ..... ....... ........ ................ 1125 
9. Auth.ority . . ................ ... . . . .. .. ........ .. . ... ....... ................. 1126 
10. Self-Contracting .... . ....... . ..... .............. ....................... 1131 
a. Self-Contracting Prohibited ...... ...... . ........ ....... . 1132 
b. Exceptions ............ ............. ............................... 1132 
11. Capacity .......... ........... . .............................................. 1133 
12. Mandatary of Both Parties .............. ........................ . 1134 
B. The Internal Relations Between the Principal and 
the Mandatary . .................... . .. ...... .... .......................... .. ..... 1135 
1. fu General ................................................................ . 1135 
2. Duties of the Mandatary to the Principal ................ 1136 
3. Duties ofth.e Principal to th.e Mandatary ................ 1137 
C. External Relations .... ......................... . ............................... 1138 
1. Relations Between the Mandatary and Third 
Persons 
.......................... .
.......... . . ........ ...................... . 1138 
a. Disclosed and Undisclosed Agency in 
Louisiana: A Brief History ............. .............. .. 1139 
b. Disclosed and Undisclosed Principals in 
th. R .. e evis1on ..........
.................. ..... ..................... 1141 
c. Partially Disclosed Principals Under the 
R .. evis1on 
................. .
...... . ...
.
..... ............ . ............. 1142 
d. Conse�uences of"Exceeding" One's 
Authonty: A Historical Background .............. 1145 
e. Article 3019 Compared 
.... ........
..... .................. 1148 
1999) A KOMMENTAR ON LOUISIANA'S NEW LA W 1089 
2. Relations Between the Principal and Third 
Persons ...................................................................... 1150 
a. Putative Mandate and Apparent 
Authority: Old Wine in a New Bottle ............ 1151 
b. Putative Mandate: New Concept, New 
Questions; "Good Faith" ................................. 1153 
c. Putative Mandate and Agency by 
Estoppel ............................................................ 1154 
IV. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................ ............ 1158 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1997, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act No. 261 (Act or 
Revision) which revised the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code 
of 1870 on the institution known as mandate in the civil law and 
agency in the common law. The Act went into effect on January 1, 
1998, and, by its own terms, "[it] shall apply to existing mandates 
and procurations, unless the application would impair obligations or 
vested rights. "1 This is an article-by-article commentary2 on most of 
the articles3 of the new Act. 
The new Act was drafted by Professor AN. Yiannopoulos, who 
served as the Reporter for this project under the auspices of the 
Louisiana State Law Institute, the official law reform agency of the 
state entrusted with the revision of the Louisiana Civil Code and 
other codes. It is therefore fitting that this Commentary, like this 
issue of the Review, is dedicated to him. Professor Yiannopoulos has 
devoted more than two decades of his professional life to revising 
I. 1997 La Acts 261 (codified as LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 2985-3032 (West 
Supp. 1999)). For an excellent recent discussion on the issue of retroactivity under 
Louisiana law, see J. Randall Trahan, 1ime for a Change: A Call to Reform Louisiana s 
Intertemporal Conflict Law (Retroactivity of Laws), 59 LA. L. REv. (forthcomi ng 1999). 
2. This form of article-by-article commentary is a continuation of previous attempts 
to introduce to Louisiana a fonn of writing that is both common and popular with busy 
judges and practitioners in other civil-law jurisdictions. For previous attempts, see Symeon 
C. Symeonides & Nicole Duarte Martin, The New Law of Co-Ownership: A Kommentar, 68 
TuL. L. REv. 69 ( 1993); Symeon Symeonides, One Hundred Footnotes to the New Law of 
Possession and Acquisitive Prescription, 44 LA. L. REV. 69 (1983). 
3. The new Act comprises articles 2985 through 3032 of the Louisiana Civil Code. 
This Commentary discusses articles 2985 through 3023. The remaining nine articles deal 
with termination of the mandate and the mandatary's authority. Because of the space 
limitations of this Review, these latter articles are not discussed here. Also for the same 
reasons, articles 3001 through 3015 are discussed in a very brief fashion. 
For purposes of accountability only, it is noted that the discussion of Articles 2985 
through 2950, 2998, and 2990 through 3000 is authored by Professor Symeonides, while the 
discussion of Articles 2991, 2993 through 2997, and 300 I through 3023 is authored by 
Professor Holmes. 
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and modernizing the Louisiana Civil Code. He began in the 1970s 
with the revision of Book II of the Civil Code on Things and, when 
that massive project was completed,4 he turned his indefatigable 
energies to Book 1,5 and then to Book ill.6 More than twenty years 
and 600 civil code articles after he began his legislative work, 
Yiannopoulos has earned the title of le /egislateur. 
The revision of the mandate articles is Professor Yiannopoulos's 
latest, but by no means his last,7 legislative project. Coincidentally, 
mandate was also the subject on which he published his first law 
review article in Louisiana, a few months after his arrival to the state in 
1958.8 In that article, Professor Yiannopoulos tried to dispel the 
confusion that characterized the treatment of the subject by some 
Louisiana courts by bringing to bear his vast knowledge of the civil 
law tradition and his keen understanding of the common law. Almost 
forty years later, he had the opportunity to implement his ideas for 
reforming the law of mandate, at least to the extent permitted by the 
realities of the collective process under the Institute's deliberative 
bodies, the Advisory Committee,9 and the Council. Notwithstanding 
these collective--and also necessary-restraints, however, he, as the 
drafter of the Act, is the proper recipient of either praise or blame, 
whichever is due. This Commentary dispenses both. 
Most of the blame, however, is on matters of detail. Overall, this 
assessment of the new Act is a decidedly positive one. The Act has 
taken some bold steps in recognizing and legitimating some useful 
common-law institutions such as undisclosed agency and apparent 
authority, which have long been part of the fabric of Louisiana 
. 4. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Forward, LA. Civ. CODE at xxxvi-xxxvii (A.N. y1annopoulos ed., West 1999). The Revision of Book II was completed in four installments 
m the years 1976 to 1979. See id. Title III on Personal Servitudes was enacted in 1976· 
Titles IV-VI on Predial Servitudes, Building Restrictions and Boundaries in 1977· Title I o� 
Things in 1978; and Title II on Ownership in 1979. &e id. In 1990, a new title o n  Co­
ownership was added. See id. 
5. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. Book I, Title I (Natural and Juridical Persons) and Title III (Absent Persons), enacted in 1987 and 1990, respectively. 
6. �ee id. Book _III, Title VI (Matrimonial Regimes, 1979), Title XXIII (Occupancy 
an� Possession, 1982), Title XXIV (Prescription, 1982-83), and Title v (Obligations Arising 
W ithout Agreement, 1995). 
7: He is alre�y working on revising the provisions of Title XIII of Book III on Deposit and Sequestration . 
. �- . Se:
. 
�thanas�i?s N. Yiannopoulos, Brokerage, Mandate, and Agency in Louisiana. Civilian Tracfz.tzon and Moder_n Practice, 19 LA. L. REv. 777 (1959). 9. The composition of the Advisory Committee was as follows: Marc Amy· Dian T. Arruebarren� Jeanne P. Breckinridge; Diane L. Crochet; Cary G. deBessonet; Robert A. Hawthorne, Jr., � C. Hebert; Stephen E. Mattesky; Symeon C. Symeonides; Susan G Talley; Robert P. Thibeaux; and James J. Carter, Jr., Staff Attorney. · 
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transactional practice and jurisprudence. At the same time, the Act has 
stayed close to the civilian origin of Louisiana law and, by introducing 
the general concept of representation and separating procuration from 
mandate, has realigned the Louisiana Civil Code with its modem 
European counterparts. These developments and others are discussed 
below. 
II. REPRESENTATION AND PROCURATION 
A. Representation 
Art. 2985. Representation 
A person may represent another person in legal relations as 
provided by law or by juridical act. This is called representation.10 
Art. 2986. The authority of the representative 
The authority of the representative may be conferred by law, by 
contract, such as mandate or partnership, or by the unilateral juridical 
act of procuration.11 
1 .  A New Name for an Old Concept 
Articles 2985 and 2986 introduce a new name for an institution 
that has always existed in Louisiana, namely the notion that one 
person may act juridically for another in a way that directly produces 
legal consequences for or against that other person. This notion is 
called "representation."12 As used in the above articles, 
representation is broader than the terms "procuration," "power of 
attorney," "mandate," and "agency," in that all the latter terms 
contemplate a representative relationship that owes its origin to the 
volition of the represented expressed directly or indirectly.13 In 
contrast, as article 2986 provides, representation may also come into 
l 0. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2985 (West Supp. 1994). 
l l .  Id. art. 2986. 
12. Today this elementacy notion is taken for granted, being recognized by virtually 
all legal systems. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of a smoothly functioning transactional 
practice in a legal system that does not recognize this concept. However, this has not always 
been so. For example, in its traditional formalism, the classical Roman law was slow to 
accept the notion that the juridical acts of one person can bind another. Although Roman Jaw 
did recognize several instances in which a person could act through an intermediary, it did 
not recognize a comprehensive concept of representation. See W.W. BUCKLAND, A TExr­
BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 533-39 (Peter Stein ed., 3d ed. 1963). 
The recognition of this concept in the civil law world was the result of medieval continental 
legal science, especially of Grotius and the natural law school of thought. See REINHARD 
ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF 0BUGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE ClvILIAN 
TRAnmoN 45-58 (2d ed .  1992). 
13. These terms are defined infra notes 72-83 and accompanying text 
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existence by operation of law and regardless of the will of the 
represented, such as in the case of minor unemancipated children 
who by law are represented by their parents. 14 This is the only new 
element introduced by-and perhaps the only utility of--the above 
articles, namely: ( 1) to alert the reader to the fact that, in addition to 
persons whose power to represent derive from the will of another, 
there are also persons whose power to represent another is granted 
directly by law; (2) to provide a new term of art for all persons 
authorized to represent others, regardless of the source of the 
pertinent power; and, (3) to signify the similarity and the common 
denominator in their respective functions by employing the same 
"umbrella term" for all classes of representatives. 
2. Legal Representation in Modem Civil Codes 
Because consensual or conventional representation (by 
procuration or mandate) is addressed in detail by other articles of 
Title XV and is discussed below, the only type of representation that 
calls for some discussion here is representation by law. As a general 
concept, this is a uniquely civilian institution.15 To understand the 
need for this institution and to appreciate its utility, one must begin 
with two basic concepts: capacity to have rights and duties (so­
called "personality") and capacity to enter into juridical acts. In 
earlier periods of history, including early Roman law, certain persons 
such as children or slaves lacked both types of capacity. For those 
persons the institution of representation had no role to play.16 Today, 
under Louisiana law, all natural persons possess the former 
14. S ee i nfra note 49 and accompanying text. 
15. For a brief but excellent comparative discussion of this subject in the English 
language, see 2 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
98 -1 08 (1 977). For extended discussions in other languages, see, for example, WOLFRAM 
MOL�ER-F�IENFELS, DIE VERTRErUNG BEIM RECHTSGESCHAFT 1 66 (1955) ; Hijmans, La 
R epr es entat wn Da ns Les Acts Juridi qu es, i n  TRAVAUX DEL' ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT N 
(1949). For an equally excellent discussion with regard to children, see SJ. Stoljar, Chi ldren, 
Pare nts a nd Gua rdia ns, i n  4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 7 
( 1973 ); RENE P_OPESCO-RAMNJC�AN<?, DE LA REPREsENTATION DANS LES ACTES JURIDIQUES EN 
DROIT COMPARE (1 927) ; FranyOIS Rigaux, Le statut de la representation, i n  20 BIBLIOTECA 
VISSERIAN (19 63). 
1 6. In early Rom� law, children of any age were subject to the pat er famili as' 
absolute power and authonty (pat �ia pot estas) and did not have capacity to acquire rights. 
Conse quently, not only
_ 
were 
_
they incapable of contracting b y  themselves but neither could 
�ybody else contract m thetr name. The pat er famili as would act not for them, but for 
himself. S ee �UCKLAND, supra note 12, at 533-37 ; ZIMMERMANN, supra note 12, at 4 5-58. 
Under these crrcumstances the concept of representation was unnecessary. 
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capacity,17 and most persons who have reached majority possess the 
latter capacity as well.18 For persons who possess both types of 
capacity, legal representation is unnecessary and conventional 
representation becomes an option for those who choose to act 
through an intermediary. 
The institution of legal representation becomes necessary for 
those persons who possess the former but lack the latter capacity. 
Today, this includes unemancipated minors as well as majors who 
because of a mental or physical infirmity are incapable of taking care 
of themselves. Recognizing this inability, civil law systems19 place 
these persons under a protected status, one of the consequences of 
which is a total or limited incapacity to enter into certain juridical acts. 
Precisely because the reason for imposing this incapacity is to protect 
rather than to punish the incapable, these systems seek other 
mechanisms for replacing, to the extent possible, the withdrawn 
capacity. Providing such a mechanism is necessary not only for the 
sake of these persons (enabling them to fulfill their basic needs and 
rendering meaningful their "capacity to have rights and duties")20 but 
also for the sake of society at large (for example, facilitating the flow 
of transactions).21 The mechanism that civil law systems have 
developed to this end is the institution of legal representation, whereby 
a person designated in advance or chosen by a court is empowered by 
law to act on behalf of the incapable person under procedures and 
limitations defined by law. 
These procedures and limitations, as well as the pertinent 
nomenclature, differ from one legal system to another and from one 
institution to the next, but they all possess the above basic character­
istics. For example, most civil law codes provide that parents 
"represent the[ir] children ... in all civil acts";22 that "[t]he guardian 
17. S ee LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 27 (West 1993) (" Al natural persons enjo y general 
legal capacit y to have rights and duties."). 
1 8. See id. art. 2 8  ("A natural person who has reached majorit y has capacit y to make 
all sorts of juridical acts, unless otherwise provided b y  legislation."). 
19. For the corresponding institutions of the co mmon law, see Stoljar, supra note 15, 
at 99 - 1 47. 
20. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 27 (West 1 993). 
2 1. Se e  A. TOUSSIS, GENIKAI AR.CHAI TOU ASTIKOU DIKAIOU [GENERA L PRINCIPLES 
OF THE CIVIL LAW] 65 6 (2d ed. 197 8) .  
22. CODICE CIVILE [ITALY C.c.] art. 320 (Ital y); s ee a lso § 1 62 6  BORGERLICHES 
GESETZBUCH [BGB] (F.R .G.) ("B y virtue of the parental authority the father and the mother 
have ... the right and the duty to take care of the person and propert y of the child ... [and 
this] includes the representation of the child."); GREEK CIV. CooE art. 1 501 ("The father 
represents the child in any juridical act relating to its personal status or its patrimon y."); 
a c o rd art. 1 52 ALLGEMEINES BORGERLI CHES GESETZBUCH [Aus. ABGB] (Aus.); C6DIGO 
CML [SPAIN C.C.] art. 15 4 (Spain) (Julio Romarach , Jr. trans., 19 84) ;  C6DIGO CIVIL [ARG. 
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·! • •  represents [the minor] in all civil acts";23. and. th�t curators of 
Interdicts or of other incapable persons have m prmc1ple the same 
representative powers as the guardian ofminors. 24 Civil-law countries 
Uefine these representative powers in varying detail in the titles of the 
particular civil code dealing with parental authority, guardianship 
(tutorship), and curatorship, respectively, and all are found in the Book 
of the code entitled "Persons"25 or "Family Law."26 The principles that 
are common among the above three cases of legal representation, 
however, are placed in a separate Title under the heading 
�'Representation," where they are treated together with the general 
principles of conventional representation. This Title is placed in 
different books of the civil code-in Italy in the book on Obligations,27 
and in Germany and Greece in the book on General Principles28-
which contain principles that apply throughout the civil code (and 
throughout the whole of private law) unless displaced by more specific 
statutory provisions.29 
: The scheme of the German, Greek, and to a lesser extent the 
Italian, civil codes appears abstract but is systematic and efficient. All 
the common principles encountered in all relations in which one 
person acts as a representative of another (whether or not the power to 
do so is derived from the law or from a juridical act) are placed in that 
part of the civil code in which all general principles are placed. All the 
specifics of the underlying (internal) relationship between the 
fepresentative and the represented are placed in the parts of the civil 
�ode where these relationships are regulated, that is, in the part dealing 
With parental authority, tutorship, curatorship, and mandate, 
respectively. 
C6o. Crv.] art. 3 08 (Arg.); CODE CIVIL SUISSE [Swrrz. Cc] art. 304 (Switz.); MINPO, art. 884 
(Japan). 
23. ITALY C.c. art. 3 57 ;  acco rd§ 1793 BGB; GREEK CJv. CODE art. 163 1 .  
1698�
4. See Swrrz. Cc art. 42 4; see also §§ 1 9 1 5, 1 793 BGB; GREEK Crv. CooE art. 
25. See Book One of the Italian Civil Code entitled "Persons and the Family." 
.. . 
2 6. S�e Book Four of the German Civil Code and Book Four of the Greek Civil Code 'entitled "Fanuly Status." 
� �7 .. See Chapter VI, arts. 1387 -1 400 of Title II ("Contracts in General") of  Book F ("Obltgattons") of the Italian Civil Code. our : ,,28. See Title 5 (§§ .1 <!4-18 1 )  of Section III ("Juridical Acts") of Book One ("General :P� � of
,,
the Gennan Civil Code; Chapter 7 ,  arts. 2 1 1 -235 of Book One ("G eral ll>rinc1ples ) of the Greek Civil Code. en 
i: 29. For the function of the Book on General Principles in the Greek and G · ·1 todes see Symeo c s ·d ennan CIVI 
l 
' 
n 
· ymeom es, lhe General Principles of the Civil Law in �::�� ���).GREEK LAW 53 , 53 -5 4  (Konstantinos D. Kerameus & Phaedon J. Ko�s 
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3. Legal Representation in the French Code civil 
The French Code civil, being older than the aforementioned 
codes, did not achieve, and perhaps did not aspire to, the same degree 
of systematization as other European civil codes. It does not 
expressly provide for the umbrella concept of representation that 
encompasses not only conventional but also legal representation. 
Instead, the Code civil regulates expressly only the contract of 
mandate, although this is only one of the many ways in which a 
representative relationship can come into existence. This is not to 
say, however, that the Code civil does not recognize the concept of 
legal representation. For example, it provides that parents "represent 
the minor in all civil acts,"30 as do tutors31 and curators.32 In contrast 
to the aforementioned codes, however, the Code civil does not extract 
from these forms of legal representation their common principles and 
does not treat them together in a separate title devoted to that topic. 
In the 1940s, the Commission set up to reform the Code civil posed 
the question of whether one should "construct a general theory of 
representation applicable to all juridical acts or whether one should 
be content to refer that matter to the book on contracts. "33 The 
question was answered by drafting a section entitled "De la 
representation" which was to be included in the chapter entitled ''De 
30. CoDE CIVIL [FR. C. crv.] art. 389-3 (Fr.). This article provides . in part: 
"L 'administrateur legal representera le mineur dans taus /es actes civils, sauf /es cas dans 
/esque/s /a /oi OU /'usage autorise /es mineurs a agir eux-memes." ("The legal administrator 
represents the minor in all civil acts, except cases where the law or usage authorize minors to 
act for themselves. '1 Id. The "legal administrator" is the parents if the parental authority is 
exercised by both parents and, if not, the custodial parent. See id. art. 389; see also id. arts. 
389-392. 
31. See id. art. 450. 
32. See id. art. 492 which speaks of an adult person placed under tutelage as a person 
who ''has need of being represented in a continuous manner in the acts of civil life" ("a 
besoin d'etre represente d'une maniere continue dans /es actes de la vie civile"). For a 
discussion in English of this and the above cited articles of the Code civil, see 1 PLANIOL & 
RIPEIIT, TREATISE ON TIIE CML LAW pt. 2, nos. 1635-2106, at 14-245 (La St. L. Inst. trans., 
12th ed. 1959). 
33. TRAVAUX DE LA COMMISSION DE REFORME DU CODE CIVIL 34 (1947-48) (author's 
trans.); see also Wolfram Miiller-Freienfels, The Law of Agency, in CIVIL LAW IN THE 
MODERN WORLD 77, 83 n.25 (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed., 1965) [hereinafter Milller­
Freienfels, Agency]. 
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la formation des acts juridiques."34 Unfortunately, for reasons 
"
al
" d 35 unrelated to this discussion, the reform never maten 1ze . 
4. Legal Representation in Traditional Common Law 
Although civil law systems take the concept of legal 
representation for granted and consider it the best, if n?t �e. 
�nly 
mechanism for enabling incapable persons to partake m Jundical 
acts common-law systems have never bought into the idea of a 
co�prehensive concept of legal representation. 36 In fact, they have 
not accepted this concept even with regard to the parent-child 
relationship37 which, in civil law systems, was the birthplace of legal 
representation.38 The reasons for the common law's reluctance to 
recognize this institution are many and varied, but they probably 
include the following: 
(1) The fact that the common law never had the concept of 
patria potestas which in the Roman civil law gradually gave birth 
to the primordial instance of legal representation of children and 
later of other incapable persons;39 
34. See 'fRAVAUX, supra note 33, at 399. For a discussion of this, and other aspects 
of the French Code Revision Project from the Louisiana perspective, see Robert A. Pascal, A 
Report on the French Civil C,ode Revision Project, 25 TuL. L. REv. 205, 208- 13 ( 195 l ). 
35. For an earlier Projet which had adopted the idea described in the text, but which 
also did not materialize, see PROJET DU CoDE DES OBLIG ATIONS DU CoM1TE FRANCO-ITALIEN 
POURL'UNION LEGISLATIVE ( 1924, 1927). 
36. This statement is limited to the "traditional " common law, as opposed to current 
statutory law in common-law jurisdictions . No attempt has been made to examine the extent 
to which contemporary common-law systems have introduced similar concepts by statute. 
37. See Stoljar, supra note 15 ,  § 7-206. "[A] basic difference between ANGLO­
AMERICAN [law] and CONTINENTAL law ...  is that in CONTINENTAL, including SOC!ALIST, 
law the parents are by law the administrators of their minor children's property as well as 
their representatives." Id. § 7-206, at IOI. 
[G]enerally. in all ju�sdi�tions � COMMON LAWO the parents do not qua parents po�s an inhere?t nght m rela�on to the assets of their children. Unless they are 
specifically appomte? as �ard1ans ?r trustees, they have no more right than a 
stranger to_ 
do anything with the children's property: nothing in their status as 
parents entitles them to administer it. 
Id. § 7-206: �t 1 02 (fo�tnote omitt�). "� C:�ntinental (but again not ANGLO-AMERICAN) law th� par�nts inherent nght to adnumster is JOIDed by a legal right of representation . . . . The nu�or, m o�er words, .thus gets an automatic (legal or statutory) representative not only entitled but indeed reqmred to act for him." Id. § 7-21 1 at 104. "In ANGLO-AM I ah . "t" st f . . ' ERICAN aw . .  
d
. n
l
�. �m lO sy emd . 
o representation exists: hence for purposes both of administration an 1t1gat1on, a guar 1an needs to be appointed .. . " Id. § 7-213 at 1 06· l 2 ZWEIGERr & KOTZ, supra note 1 5, at 102-03. 
' ' see a so 
38. See 2 ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 1 5  at I 02 
39. "It is probable that the Common Law has
. 
no com h · tati bee · d"d 
pre ens1ve statutory represen on ause 1t 1 not have the concept of patria potestas ." Id. 
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(2) The fact that, from the beginning of its history, the common 
law has looked at these matters through the prism of agency 
which is too different a concept from which to extrapolate 
solutions for the predicament of legal incompetents. Indeed, 
common law agency differs from civil law legal representation in 
several ways, including the following: 
(i) agency depends on the volition of the principal 
(whether that volition is expressed or implied, actual or 
imputed, and whether it is expressed through acts or 
omissions), whereas legal representation is independent of 
the volition of the represented who, after all, is incapable of 
formulating or expressing a volition; 
(ii) agency connotes a relationship in which the principal is 
capable of exercising control over the agent (whether or not 
that capacity to control is bargained away), whereas in legal 
representations the represented lacks the capacity to control 
the representative (which is why the legal order provides 
other vehicles of control, such as court supervision, consent 
of"family council," etc.); and 
(iii) to the extent that an agency relationship qualifies as, or 
sufficiently resembles, an employment relationship, it can 
give rise to delictual liability of the principal for the acts of 
the agent, whereas legal representation as such never entails 
delictual responsibility of the represented. 
(3) Unlike the civil law, the common law was never bothered by, 
and in fact invented, the notion of separating legal and equitable 
title. In turn, this notion gave birth to the institution of the trust 
which provides an alternative means of protecting children and 
other incompetents who own property. With that institution in 
place, the need for an additional or parallel (albeit less expensive) 
mechanism of protecting children and other incapables was not 
as strong in the common law as it might have been in the civil 
law world; and 
(4) The general aversion of the common law towards 
abstraction. Indeed, there is no denying that legal representation 
is a theoretical construct, the practical utility of which depends on 
the details. Some systems prefer to focus on the details without 
worrying about how the details fit into a general scheme. Both 
the common law and the early Roman civil law began that way. 
Modem civil law has taken the latter step of constructing the 
general scheme within which the details fit. 
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5. Legal Representation in the Old Louisiana Civil Code 
Not surprisingly, the Louis
.
iana Civil Codes of 1825 an? 1870 
followed the French model. Like the French code and unlike the 
Gennan, Greek, or Italian codes, the Louisiana Civil Code does not 
contain a separate title on representation in general, and treats the 
conventional representation only in the context of the contract of 
mandate.40 However, until 1960, the Louisiana Civil Code, like the 
Code civil, did contain several provisions which recognized the 
existence of the concept of legal representation with regard to 
parents,41 tutors,42 and curators of interdicts.43 In a stroke of genius, 
the drafters of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1960 decided to purge 
the Civil Code of most of these provisions44 and to replace them with 
40. S ee LA. Crv. CODE arts. 2985-3034 (1870). 
41. S ee id. arts. 222, 235. Article 222 provided that the parents' authority to deal 
with the minor's property was the same "as in case of minors represented by tutors .... " See 
id. art. 222. Article 235 provided that parents ''may, as long as their children are under their 
authority, appear for them in court in every kind of civil suit, in which they may be interested, 
and they may likewise accept any donation made to them." S ee id. art. 235. In 1960, the 
above quoted portion of article 222 was moved to the Code of Civil Procedure. S ee LA. 
CODE. CN. PROC. ANN. art. 4501(West 1961). 
42. S ee LA. Crv. CODE art. 337 (1870). This article provided that tutors "shall have 
the care of the person of the minor, and shall represent him in all civil acts ." Id. In 1960, this 
article was repealed and replaced with a similar article in the Code of Civil Procedure. S ee  
LA. CODE. CN. PROC. ANN. art. 4262 (West 1998); s ee also i nfra note 48 (quoting Code of 
Civil Procedure article 4262). 
43. S ee LA. Crv. CODE art. 415 (1870) (subjecting curators to the rules governing 
tutors). In 1960, this article was replaced by a similar article in the Code of Civil Procedure. 
S ee LA. CODE. Crv. PROC. ANN. art. 4554 (West 1961 ). 
44. Of the provisions cited supra in notes 41-43, only article 235 was left in the Civil 
Code. This is somewhat ironic because although most of the articles moved to the Code of 
Civil Procedure were substantive. S ee, e.g., LA. CODE. CN. PROC. ANN. art. 4261 (West 
1998). Article 235 could qualify as procedural to the extent it speaks of representation "in 
court in every kind of civil suit." LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 235 (West 1993). Furthermore, 
the fact �at !fle only article l:ft. in the Civil Code gives parents plenary power of representation m court, �ut only hrmted power of representation in juridical acts outside the 
context of C<?urt �roceedmgs (for example, only to "accept any donation") is another anomaly 
th� coul� give i:is� to. � a contrario argument th.at parents lack the power to represent their �nor ch�ldren m Jurtdtc�l acts o�er than donations. The reason this argument would be 
mcorrect ts the fact that �us power ts granted by  the Code of Civil Procedure, albeit through a 
cross-reference to the articles on tutors. S ee infra note 45. 
The pur�g �f pro�isions of this kind from the Civil Code continued in the revision of the l�w of obhgattons .
m 1984 .. Until that time, article 1785 of the Civil Code of 1870 pro�tded that unemanc1pated mmors could contract ''with the intervention of their tutors ,, which und�.� the sch��
.
o.f the C.ode also included parents. LA. Crv. CODE art. 1785 ( J 870). The word mtervenhon ts ambiguous. It could mean either that th · Id thro gh th ed' f th  th . . e mmor cou contract u : m '.urn o e tutor, at 1s, with the tutor acting as the minor's representative or that the mmor himself could contract but with the tutor's co I ·th ' · provision served a useful purpose in that it affirmative) 
n�:r;ice. n et er case, this 
minors could enter into contracts. The i 984 Obligations 
� pr?�1 e a means through which 
provision without explanation, although the Revision did 
evts�
d
on rem
l
oved. the above-quo�ed prov1 e exp anatlons for removing 
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identical or similar provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure under 
an arrangement that is a marvel of draftsmanship.45 This decision 
would have been understandable if one were to assume that legal 
representation of minors and interdicts is necessary only in the 
context of court proceedings. However, even these drafters must 
have known better46 because the articles they were removing from 
the Civil Code provided for representation "in all civil acts"47 and 
because the new articles of the Code of Civil Procedure also provide 
for representation "in all civil matters."48 
Be that as it may, there has never been any doubt that in 
Louisiana, minor unemancipated children are represented by their 
parents, that this power is granted directly by law, and that, as long as 
the parent's maniage lasts, the power exists without the necessity of 
court confirmation.49 In contrast, in the case of tutors and curators of 
other provisions from the former article. See LA. av. CODE ANN. art.  1 923 cmts. (West 
1987) (replacing former article 1785). The articles surrounding article 1 923 address 
situ ations in which an unassisted unemancipated minor enters into a contract by himself, and 
even recognize the role of their "legal representatives" in rescinding such a contract, see, e.g., 
id. arts. 1 919, 1 921 ,  b ut are completely silent on the possibility of minors contracting through 
their parents or t utors. Although this apparent gap could prove problematic, the problem is 
avoided if one keeps in mind that the articles of the Code of Civil Procedure, see infra notes 
45-46, 48, which, although not mentioned in any of the comments under the Obligations 
articles, recognize the representative role of parents and tutors. 
45. For ex ample, the Code of Civil Procedure devotes fifteen detailed articles 
(articles 4261-4275) to the less common institution, the tutorship of minors, and therein 
provides that the tutor "sh all represent [the minor] in all civil matters." LA. CoDE av. PROC. 
ANN. art. 4262 (West 1 998). Then, the Code devotes only two articles to parents and through 
a cross-reference to the articles on tutors gives parents the same powers "as in [the] case of a 
minor represented by a t utor." Id. art. 4501 (West 196 1 ). The Code does the same with 
regard to curators. See id. art. 4554. 
46. W h at the drafters apparently did not know was how to define the limits of their 
own jurisdiction. For example in article 4261 they provide: "The tutor shall h ave custody of 
and sh all care for the person of the minor. He sh all see that the minor is properly reared and 
ed ucated in accordance with his station in life." LA. Crv. CODE PROC. ANN. art. 4261 (West 
1998). While this article is well-drafted and almost poetic, does it belong in a code of 
procedure? 
47. See LA. av. CODE ANN. art. 337 ( 1 870) (repealed 1960) (emph asis added); see 
also supra note 42. 
48. See LA. CoDE Civ. PROC. ANN. art. 4262 (emph asis added) (West 1 998) ("[The 
tutor] shall enforce all obligations in favor of the minor and sh all represent him in all civil 
matters.''). Through cross-references in the pertinent articles, this article is also made 
applicable to parents and curators of interdicts. See, e.g. , id. arts. 4501 (parents), 4554 
(curators) (West 1 96 1 ). 
49. For detailed discussion of the subject of legal representation of minors and other 
incompetents, see KATIIERINE s. SPAIIT, LoUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE §§ 1 5- 18  (2d ed. 
1998); Christopher L. Blakesley, Child Custody and Parental Authority in France, Louisiana 
and Other States of the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. 
REV. 283 (1981); Robert A. Pascal, Contracts of the Minor or His Representative Under the 
Louisiana Civil Code, 8 LA. L. REv. 383 (1948); C.  Ellis Henican, Jr., Com ment, Care of the 
Person and Property of the Minor, 32 TuL. L. REv. 299 ( 1958). 
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interdicts, the power is also granted by law rather than by
. 
the volition 
of the represented, but the representatives must be appomted by the 
court.50 
The same is true in most other instances of legal representation 
provided by the Civil Code or the Code of Civil Procedure, such as in 
the cases of: "absent person[ s ]" who own property in this state that is 
under the authority of a court-appointed curator;51 absent creditors who 
are represented by a court-appointed attorney;52 "unrepresented," 
"non-resident," or "absentee" defendants who are represented by a 
court-appointed attorney as provided in articles 5091-5098 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure;53 "absentee" heirs or legatees who are represented 
by a court-appointed attomey;54 a ''vacant succession" that is 
administered and represented by a court-appointed "administrator;"55 
etc.56 The fact that in the above cases the "representative" is appointed 
by a court rather than directly by law does not mean that these are 
')udicial" rather than "legal" representations. After all, the court's 
authority to appoint a representative is granted by law rather than by 
the represented person. 57 
Similarly, the fact that in some of these instances the 
representative is authorized to act in his own name rather than in the 
name of the represented does not mean that he is not a true 
representative. 58 After all, even in cases where the representative is 
permitted to act in his own name, he is still required to act for the 
benefit of the represented. Any doubts that might have existed under 
50. See LA. CODE Crv. PROC. ANN. arts. 403 1-446 1 (tutors), 4541-4557 (curators) 
(West 1998). 
5 1 .  See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 47-48 (West 1 993). 
52. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3088 ( 1870): "Absent creditors . . .  are to be represented 
by an attorney . . . .  " 
53. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 509 1 -5098 (West 1998). 
54. See id. art. 3 1 7 1 .  
55. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1097 (West 1 952); LA. CoDE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 
3 121-3122 (West Supp. 1999). 
56. . Obviously, the above does not purport to be an exhaustive list of legal representatives. For example, the Code of Civil Procedure and the Revised Statutes are 
replete with provisions authorizing court appointment of attorneys to repre�ent children and 
other persons incapable of representing themselves. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:345 
(West 1991) (attorney to represent the child in visitation proceedings); id. § 9 :603 (attorney to 
represent absentee minor or in�erdictJ; id. § 9:3 1 85 (curator ad hoc for absent defendant). 
57. In �e a?ove-mentioned mstances, the will of the represented is irrelevant because 
the represented is either legally (as � the case of minors and interdicts) or factually (as in the 
case of absentees or absent persons) mcapable of conferring the power. 
58 . . Se�, e.g. , LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4264 (West 1998) (providing that "[t]he 
tutor ac� m his own name as tutor, and without th e  concurrence of the minor"); see also 
P�cal, m SPAHT, supra �ote .
49, § 15. 16: "To say that the father (or mother) represents the 
rrunor means that he acts m his own name, not in the name of the minor." 
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the old law, which confined the definition of mandataries to persons 
who acted "in [the principal 's] name"59 had long been resolved by the 
jurisprudence which recognized the concept of undisclosed mandate, 60 
and have been completely eliminated by the new definition of mandate 
which considers as mandataries all persons who ''transact one or more 
affairs for the principaf' under his express, implied, or apparent 
authority, and regardless of whether they do so in their own name.61 
Conversely, the fact that the representative may act in his own 
name rather than in the name of the represented should not obscure the 
fact that, like a mandatary, the representative acts not on his own 
behalf or benefit, but rather on behalf and for the benefit of the 
represented. Finally, the fact that, as in the case of the mandatary, the 
juridical acts of the representative operate directly in favor of or 
against the represented distinguishes these representatives from other 
persons such as trustees who, although they also act for the benefit of 
others, do so in their own name and in their own right. 62 
6. The Utility of the New Articles 
New articles 2985 and 2986 are not intended to and do not 
change any of the above principles. After all, these articles are 
merely definitional rather than substantive. As said earlier, their only 
function is to draw attention to the existence of all these various 
kinds of legal representation and to suggest that there are certain 
similarities between them and certain aspects of conventional 
representation. This suggestion of  similarities, however, is very 
indirect and incomplete. It can be surmised from the use of a 
common term to encompass both legal and conventional 
representations (the umbrella term "representation"), from the 
creation of a new chapter called "Representation," and from 
changing the name of Title XV from "Of Mandate" to 
"Representation and Mandate. "63 
It would have been highly desirable if the new Act were to take 
the next logical step and provide expressly that ''unless otherwise 
provided, legal representation is subject to the rules governing 
text. 
59. LA. Crv. CODE art. 2985 (1870); see also infra notes 72-73 and accompanying 
60. See Sentell v. Richardson, 29 So. 2d 852, 855-56 (La. 1947); see also discussion 
infra notes 293-298 and accompanying text 
6 1 .  LA. CIV. CooE ANN. art. 2989 (West Supp. 1999) (emphasis added); see also 
discussion infra Part III.A. 
62. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9: 1 73 1 ,  1781 ,  2061, 2118-2123 (West 1991). 
63. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN., Book II, Title XV, ch. 1 (West Supp. 1 999). 
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mandate to the extent that their application is compatible with the 
particular legal representation.''64 S�ch an article would �ve the 
practical effect of making applicable m a supplementary fashion the 
articles on mandate to fill the gaps of those parts of the code that deal 
with legal representation. These gaps are not negligible, especially 
because many instances of legal representation are provided in the 
Code of Civil Procedure, which is ill-equipped to deal with substantive 
institutions. An even better and bolder step would have been to follow 
the model of the modem civil codes described above and to actually 
identify those common principles between legal and conventional 
representation and to treat them together. 65 This solution would have 
been a real service to the legal profession and would have brought 
Louisiana law to the twentieth century just before this century is about 
to expire. 
While it is regrettable that the new Act has failed to take either of 
these steps, it is also important to note, in the interest of accuracy of 
the historical record, that this failure should not be blamed on the Act's 
drafter, Professor Yiannopoulos, whose proposals to that effect were 
rejected by the Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute. This 
august deliberative body, which is known for its commitment to 
progress, thought that the only proper use of the term ''representation" 
was the use made in Civil Code article 88 1 to describe the right of 
descendants of an heir who had predeceased the de cujus to inherit in 
the heir's place.66 Ironically, that article recognizes that this so-called 
representation is "a fiction of the law. "67 Apparently, in the eyes of 
some members of the Council, this fiction has displaced reality so that 
any other use of the term representation, even one that is closer to the 
dictionary definition of it, would be confusing. Eventually, a majority 
of �e Council grudgingly allowed the use of the term representation in 
articles 2985-2986 but under the express condition68 that the Reporter 
64. As the reader will notice, the above quoted sentence tracks almost verbatim the languag� of LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2988, infra text accompanying note 7
1 
regarding procuration. ' 
. 
65. �or an indicati
_
on of what these common principles might encompass, see the pertinent articles of the Italian, Greek, and German civil codes, cited supra notes 22-28. 66. See LA. CIV. C�DE �- art. 881 (West Supp. 1 999) ("Representation is a fiction of the law, the effect of which is to put the representative in the place degree and "ghts f the person represented."). ' • n o 
67. Id. 
. 6�. A researcher would search in vain for means of documentin th d1
��
ss10�. Th
�
old practice of�e In�tute was to tape-record the Council's �eli:er:�:: ;�:g�:feth�e mmsti.�t�t:��tst� CC::thc�: :::1�e�=��� �� =o:ne::�; :�: :: :� u es. mce e nud-I 990s the a· f . , prac ce o tape-recordmg the discussions 
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would draft a comment specifically explaining the difference between 
this tenn and the fictional representation of article 881. 69 Under these 
circumstances, any attempt to do more, such as by taking either of the 
two steps suggested above, was bound to fail. 
Fortunately, none of this prevents courts from taking at least the 
first of the steps suggested above, namely recognizing the similarities 
between legal an d  conventional representation and filling the gaps left 
by the rules regulating the fonner through an analogical application of 
the rules governing the latter. The new articles pennit and encourage 
this development, an d  in that sense this is their real utility. 
B. Procuration 
Art. 2987. Procuration defined; person to whom addressed 
A procuration is a unilateral juridical act by which a person, the 
principal, confers authority on another person, the representative, to 
represent the principal in legal relations. 
The procuration may be addressed to the representative or to a 
person with whom the re�resentative is authorized to represent the 
principal in legal relations. 0 
Art. 2988. Applicability of the rules of mandate 
A procuration is subject to the rules governing mandate to the extent 
that the application of those rules is compatible with the nature of the 
procuration. 71 
1 .  Confusion of Terms and Concepts in the Civil Code of 1 870 
New article 2987 defines "procuration" in a way that separates it 
conceptually from the contract of mandate. In so doing, the new 
article eliminates the confusion of terms and concepts that 
characterized the Louisiana Civil Code's prior provisions on this 
subject, a confusion that was traceable to the Code's French sources. 
has ceased, and the minutes have become very brief, describing only the Council's decisions 
but not its discussions. 
69. The Reporter faithfully complied. See LA. av. CooE ANN. art. 2985 cmt (c) 
(West Supp. 1999) (stating that, as used in article 2985, representation "has nothing to do 
with the use of the word 'representation' in the law of successions to denote 'a fiction of the 
law, the effect of which is to put the representative in the place, degree, and rights of the 
person represented,' that is the deceased ancestor") (quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 881 
(West Supp. 1999)). Equally unnecessary, but also attributable to the same reason, is another 
statement in the same comment stating that, as used in Article 2985, ''the legal institution of 
representation has nothing to do with the use of the word representation to denote statements 
made by one person to another." Id. art. 2985 (citations omitted). 
70. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2987 (West Supp. 1 999). 
7 1 .  Id. art. 2988. 
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Article 2985 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 used the two terms 
interchangeably by providing that "[a] mandate, procuration or letter 
of attorney is an act by which one person gives power to another to 
transact for him and in his name, one or several affairs. "72 This article 
was taken from the French Projet du Gouvernement of 1800,73 which 
was also the source of article 1984 of the Code civil.74 
Interestingly, the first Louisiana version of the above article was 
somewhat less confusing. In the Digest of 1 808, the opening words 
of the pertinent article were "[ l]e mandat ou procuration" which 
were translated into English as "[a] procuration or letter of 
attomey."75 The addition of the term "letter of attorney" was an 
understandable attempt to explain to a primarily English-speaking 
readership the meaning of the rather obscure French word 
procuration.16 More interesting was the fact that the English text did 
not contain the word "mandate. "77 This, however, was not a 
mistranslation. Despite the tendency to question the competence and 
sometimes the integrity of the translators of the 1808 Digest, here the 
failure to use the English word "mandate" made the translation more 
72. LA. Crv. CODE art. 2985 (1870) (repealed 1 997). 
73. See Projet du Gouvemement art. 1 ,  reproduced in COMPILED EDmON OF TIIE 
CIVJL CODES OF LOUISIANA (Joseph Dainow ed. 1972), codified at LA. STAT. ANN. art. 2986 
(West 1972). 
74. Article 1 984 Code civil provides: 
Le mandat ou procuration est une acte par lequel une personne donne a une 
autre le pouvoir de faire quelque chose pour le mandant et en son nom. 
Le contrat ne se forme que par I 'acceptation du mandataire. 
[Mandate or procuration is an act by which a person grants to another the 
power to do something for the principal and in his name. 
The contract is formed only through acceptance by the mandatary.] 
FR. C. CIV. art. 1 984 (author's trans.) (emphasis added). The two paragraphs of this article 
were proposed as two separate articles in the Projet du Gouvemement. See Projet du 
Gouvemement, supra note 73. As will be explained, their combination into one article in the 
Code Napoleon helps reduce the confusion described in the text. 
75. See LA. CI�. CODE art. 1 ( 1808); infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
.76. The term 1s, of course, of Latin origin. In classical Roman law, a procurator ommum bonorum was a freedman (former slave) who was appointed by the master to look 
after and administer his 
.
property. See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 1 2. The act of appointment was call� the procuratzo. G�ually, and �ery cautiously, Roman law eventually granted to and agamst the master certam legal actions for the juridical acts entered into by the 
J?'°?''�tor on the m�er's behalf See id. Thus, the procuratio was one of the Roman 1�stttun.ons out of which eventually grew the more general concept of representation For discussion of the. procur�t�, �ee J.H. Michel, Quelques observations sur l 'evoluti�n du Procurator en dro1t Ro'!'am, m ETUDES OFFERTES A JEAN MACQUERON 5 1 5  ( 1970). The new Act dehberately and correctly avoids using the common-law terms "letter of �����y" and "power of attorney." See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2987 cmt. (a) (West Supp. 
77. See LA. Crv. CODE art. 1 ( 1808). 
1999] A KOMMENTAR ON LOUISIANA 'S NEW LA W 1105 
accurate78 for the sense in which the French tenn "mandat" was used 
in the French original was synonymous with the French term 
"procuration" in that they both signified the unilateral juridical act by 
which the principal (the "mandant") confers representative power on 
the mandatary (the "mandataire").79 It would therefore be redundant 
to use both words ("mandat" and "procuration"), especially because 
the use of another synonym ("power of attorney") was thought 
necessary. Additionally, this latter synonym, although a distinctly 
common-law term and thus objectionable on that ground, was 
conceptually closer to the meaning of "procuration" in that it too 
connotes the unilateral juridical act by which the representative 
power is conferred. In contrast, depending on context, the French 
term "mandat" can mean either the unilateral act of conferring the 
representative power80 or the bilateral juridical act (contract) that 
results when the mandatary accepts.81 Because the latter is the more 
common usage of the tenn, its use as a synonym to procuration is 
confusing. By avoiding this use, the 1808 translators, and later the 
1825 translators, were able to avoid this confusion. 
Unfortunately, in the less erudite revision of 1870, this 
confusion was not avoided. As seen above, the 1 870 Code uses the 
terms "mandate," "procuration," and "letter or attorney" 
interchangeably. 82 This terminological confusion is eliminated by 
78. In contrast, the failure of the 1 808 translators to include the words "et en son 
nom" ("and in his [the principal's] name'') in the English text resulted in an inaccurate 
translation. See COMPII..ED EDmON, supra note 73, at 3 9 1  (discussing Digest of 1 808). This 
omission might have also been less innocent in that it runs contrary to one of the basic 
features of the French scheme, namely its steadfast refusal to recognize undisclosed a gency. 
See infra text accompanying notes 137-138. This omission was cured in the 1 825 and 1 870 
Codes which reinserted the above quoted words in the article. Compare LA. Crv. CODE ANN. 
art. 2954 ( 1 825) (Comp. ed. 1 972), with LA. Crv. CODE art. 2985 (1870). However, since 
1947, these words have been effectively "read out" of the article. See Sentell v. Richardson, 
29 So. 2d 852, 855 (La. 1 947) (recognizi ng undisclosed agency); see also infra notes 293-
298 and accomp anying text. 
79. This is confirmed by reading together the first two articles of th e  French Projet 
which were combined into one article (article 1 984) by the Cade civil. See supra note 74. 
By reading the second paragraph of this article, one easily understands that the term 
"mandat" in the first parag raph of the same article is used in the sense of the unilateral act of 
conferring the power (i.e., as a true synonym to procuration) rather than in th e  sense of the 
contract of mandate. This inference becomes less clear when the two provisions are placed 
in separate, albeit consecutive articles (as was done in the French Projet and the Louisiana 
Digest of 1 808), and much more difficult when these articles are not consecutive (as was the 
case in the Civil Codes of 1 870 and 1 825, where these articles were separated by two other 
articles). See LA. Crv. CODE arts. 2985-2988 ( 1 870). 
80. See, e.g. , FR. C. CIV. arts. 1985, 1 988, 1 989. 
8 1 .  See, e.g. , id. arts. 1 986, 1 992, 2003, 2008. For the text of the relevant provision, 
see supra note 74 (quoting FR. C. crv. art. 1 984). 
82. See LA. Crv. CoDE art. 2985 (1870). 
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new article 2987, which defines procuration in the sense of the 
unilateral act described above and sets it apart from the tenn 
"mandate," reserved exclusively to denote the bilateral juridical act 
or contract between a principal and a mandatary. 83 
2. Confusion in the French Code civil 
In addition, new Article 2987 eliminates the conceptual 
confusion which beset not only the Louisiana Civil Code but also the 
French Code civil. Indeed, the Code civil (and hence the Louisiana 
Civil Code of 1870) stands apart from modem civil codes in one 
important respect. Except for cases of legal representation described 
earlier in this Article, the Code civil views conventional 
representation as being tied inseparably to the contract of mandate.84 
It defines mandate as necessarily including the power of the 
mandatary to represent the principal. 85 In the scheme of the Code 
civil, a mandate without this power is n ot a mandate; and outside the 
sphere of legal representation, this power cannot exist without a 
mandate. 86 The former element is a departure from the Roman 
definition of the contract of mandatum which did not carry with it the 
power of the mandatary to represent the principal. 87 
The latter element is something from which modern civil codes 
have departed, mostly as a result of the influence of the work of Paul 
Laband, a nineteenth centwy German scholar. 88 The German Civil 
Code and all the civil codes influenced by it adopt a sharp distinction 
between the conferral of power of representation (Vollmacht), on the 
one hand, and the underlying relationship between the representative 
and the represented, on the other hand. 89 The former is a unilateral 
83. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2987 (West Supp. 1999). 
84. See FR. C. CIV. art. 1984. 
85. See id. 
86. See id. 
87. See BUCKLAND, supra note 12, at 5 1 4-21 · ZIMMERMANN surpra note 1 2  at 413-
14, 420-21 .  
,
' 
' 
88. See Pa�l Laband, Die Stellvertretung bei dem Abschluss von Rechtsgeschiiften 
nach dem Allgemeznen Deutschen Handelsgesetzbuch 10 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR HANDELSRECHT 
1 83 (l 866). 
' 
89. This s".Paration is evidenced by the fact that, as explained above, these codes devote a se�arate tttle to the general co�cept �f representation and then regulate the contract of mandat� tn the part of the code dealmg wtth nominate contracts. See supra Part II A 2 The meam�g of�1s separate treatment is that the power to represent another is ind 
·
d�; of the relanonsh1p between the represented and the representa.;ve Th. · d epen · . t d t . f " . IS ID ependence IS easter o e ect m cases o legal representation where as explained bo th does not express
_ 
any will either to have, or especially to select a repr:se�t�tiv: 
rere;ented 
contractual relationship with him or her. See su ra Part 11 A 2 or 0 0.rm a representation, however, this independence is mo�e difficult 
·
to
.
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juridical act, while the latter is a bilateral juridical act-a contract. 
That contract can be a mandate, which in these codes does not on its 
own entail representative powers, a partnership, an employment 
contract, a contract for services, or any other similar contract. 
This separation of representation from mandate is considered by 
some German authors as one of the greatest accomplishments of the 
modem civil law.90 If this is true, then one might say that, by adopting 
a similar though not as complete separation, the new Act has moved 
Louisiana a step closer to modem civil law.91 
3. Conceptual Differences Between Procuration and Mandate 
Under the New Act 
Under the new Act, the differences between procuration and 
mandate can be gleaned from juxtaposing the two definitions provided 
in new articles 2987 and 2989, respectively. 
Article 2987 Article 2989 
A procuration is a wrilateral jurid cal act A mandate is a contract 
by which a person, the principaL by which a person, the principal, 
confers authority on another person, the confers authority on another person, 
representative, the mandatary, 
to represent the principal in legal to transact one or more affairs for the 
relations.92 principal. 93 
This juxtaposition reveals the following conceptual differences 
between procuration and mandate: 
(1)  A procuration is a unilateral juridical act, whereas a mandate 
is a contract, i.e., a bilateral juridical act;94 
(2) In both acts, one person, called the "principal," confers 
authority on another person, called "representative" and 
"mandatary," respectively; 
(3) The content of the conferred authority is different. In a 
procuration, the authority is to "represent' the principal, that is, to 
to have a representative, his selection, and the relationship with him all owe their origin to the 
actual or imputed will of the represented. 
90. See Milller-Freienfels, Age ncy ,  supra note 33 , at 81 ("The clear and sharp 
distinction of these two notions has been one of the major achievements of nineteenth­
century European legal science."); Hans Dolle, Juristische E ntdecku nge n, 42 
VERHANDLUNGEN DES ZWEIUNDVIERZIGSTEN DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES B l  (1959) (calling 
this notion one of the most remarkable ·�uristic discoveries" in legal history). 
9 1 .  The newest continental civil code, the Dutch Civil Code of 1992, adopts the same 
separation. See BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] bk.3 tit.3, bk. 3 tit.7 (Neth.). 
92. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2987 (West Supp. 1999). 
93. Id. art. 2989. 
9 4. See infra Part II.B.4. 
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act in the principal's place as the principal would ha�e �ted;:5 In a mandate, the authority is to ''transact . .  .for the pnnc1pal, that 
is, to cany out a particular activity and accomplish a result for the 
benefit of the principal.96 
( 4) In a procuration, the authority is to represent the principal "in 
legal relations," that is, in acts of  a juridical nature. In a mandate, 
the authority is to transact "one or more affairs for the principal," 
that is, to cany out acts of either a juridical or material nature, or 
both. 
Beginning with the last point, there is little doubt that the tenn 
"affairs" as used in new article 2989 encompasses material acts. This 
is stated directly in the comments accompanying this article97 and can 
also be gleaned from the fact that the same term is employed in the 
articles of the Civil Code regulating the institution of negotiorum 
gestio, that is the management of the "affairs" of another without a 
mandate.98 Indeed in the context o f  the latter institution the quoted 
term is understood as encompassing primarily material acts, although 
it does not exclude juridical acts.99 What is also clear is that the use of 
the word "affairs" as opposed to 'juridical acts" in the new article 
2989 was as deliberate as it was consistent with the traditional 
definition of mandate. 100 
In turn, the use of the broader term "affairs" in the definition of 
mandate helps explain the most important conceptual difference 
between mandate and procuration. Although procuration and mandate 
95. The word "represent" suggests that the representative must act in the principals 
name. Indeed, in continental civil law the representative must so act. See FR. C. CIV. art. 
1 984; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text. However, this is so because these 
systems explicitly refuse to sanction what is known in common-law systems as the concept 
of undisclosed agency. See supra note 78; infra notes 1 37-138 and accompanying text. The 
fact that the new Act expressly recognizes this concept, see infra note 308 and accompanying 
text, suggests that the word "represent" in article 2987 must be understood as also 
encompassing situations in which the representative acts in his own name but on the 
principal 's behalf. See infra Part 11.B.4. 
96. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2989 (West Supp. 1 999) (emphasis added). 
97. See id. cmt. (d): "[A]n 'affair' may be either a juridical act or a material act. 
Louisiana decisions may be found in which a mandatary was charged with th e  responsibility for certain material acts." (citing Roth v. B & L Enters., Inc., 420 So. 2d 1 094 (La 1 982) (receiving pa�ent); :'-laynick v. Jefferson Bank & Trust Co., 45 1 So. 2d 627 (La. Ct. App. 1 984� (colle�ting .of mdebtedness); Craft v. Trahan, 3 5 1  So. 2d 277 (La. Ct. App. 1 977) (making repair eshmates)). 
98. See id. arts. 2292-2297 (West 1997). 
9�. See id art. 2292 cmt. {b) ("The affair managed may be a material act, such as the pro�ect1on o� property from fire or flood, or the execution of a juridical act such as a sale f penshable thmgs. "). ' o 
. . .
100. See id. art. 2989 cmt. ( e) (West Supp. 1 999) ("Limiting the contract of mandate to Jund1cal acts would be an unnecessary departure from the civilian tradition."). 
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may-and usually do-coexist in the same relationship, this is by no 
means necessary. A procuration, namely, the conferral of authority to 
represent, is not an essential element of a mandate. At least in theory, 
a mandatary need not be a representative. For example, a mandatary 
that is authorized to do only material acts for the principal is clearly 
not a representative. Conversely, a representative need not be a 
mandatary. For example, as explained above, a legal representative 
such as a tutor or a curator is clearly not a mandatary, if only because 
the relationship between the representative and the represented, not 
being a contract, cannot be a mandate. Even in cases of conventional 
representation, however, the underlying relationship between the 
representative and the represented need not be based on a contract of 
mandate. It may be based on a partnership contract, an employment 
contract, or another nominate or innominate contract. 
4. Procuration Is a Unilateral Juridical Act 
As said above, article 2987 defines procuration as a "unilateral 
juridical act." What is the meaning of the quoted term, and what is 
the practical significance of so defining the procuration? 
Regarding the first question, it is worth noting that this is the first 
time101 the term ''unilateral juridical act" is employed in the text of the 
Louisiana Civil Code102 or, for that matter, any other Louisiana statute. 
Although neither this term, nor the broader tenn ')uridical act"103 is 
10 I .  This term was first used in the comments under articles 5 1 7  and 654, also drafted 
by Professor Yiannopoulos in 1979 and 1977, respectively. See LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 5 17  
cmt. (c) (West 1 980) (referring to "[a] unilateral juridical act, such as an acknowledgement"); 
id. art. 654 cmt. (b) (stating that "conventional servitudes may arise from contracts as well as 
from unilateral juridical acts"). 
l 02. The Civil Code speaks of "unilateral contracts" which it defines as those in which 
''the party who accepts the obligation of the other does not assume a reciprocal obligation." 
Id. art. 1907 (West 1 987). It is clear that this term has nothing to do with the homonymous 
term ''unilateral contract" as used in the common law. It is equally clear that a unilateral 
contract as defined in article 1907 differs from a unilateral juridical act in that the former is a 
contract, while the latter is not. According to article 1906, a contract is an "agreement by two 
or more parties." Id. art. 1 906 (emphasis added). In a unilateral act there is only one party, 
and thus there is no "agreement" and no "contract." 
l 03. Until Professor Yiannopoulos began his revision of the Civil Code in the 1970s, 
the term "juridical act" was not used anywhere in the Civil Code. The first time this term 
was employed in the text of a Civil Code article was in 1977. See LA. av. CODE ANN. art. 
544 (West 1 980) ("Usufruct may be established by a juridical act . . .  .'). In the intervening 
20 years before the enactment of the Mandate Revision, the term ')uridical act" has been 
used in 14 other Civil Code articles, all but one of which have been drafted by Yiannopoulos. 
See LA. CN. CODE ANN. arts. 7, 28, 49 (West 1 993); id. arts. 492, 495, 654, 776, 797, 807 
(West 1980); id. arts. 347 1 ,  3483, 3541 (West 1 994). In addition, the term ')uridical act" is 
used in the comments under 35 other Civil Code articles, all but 1 2  of which have been 
drafted by Yiannopoulos. 
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defined by the text of the Civil Code, the� �earrings are no �onger 
disputed. A juridical act is any lawful volit1onal act ( declarat10n or 
manifestation of will) intended to produce legal consequences to 
which the law attributes the intended consequences or other legal 
consequences. 104 A juridical act is unilateral when it is the product of 
the will of one party105 and its completion or effectiveness does not 
depend on the will of another party. A juri�cal �t is bilateral or 
multilateral when it is the product of the combmed wills of more than 
one party. A testament is the clearest example of a unilateral act, 106 
while a contract is the clearest example of a bilateral juridical act. 
The second question asked above is more difficult because, 
despite being a unilateral act, the procuration-by its very nature-­
always contemplates the possibility of becoming the basis of a bilateral 
act in that it invites the expression of will or the act of another party, 
the representative. 107 When that party expresses his will to act 
pursuant to the grant of authority or acts accordingly, a contract 
I 04. The definitions provided by the comments to several articles of the Civil Code 
are helpful. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 492 cmt. (b) (West 1980) (stating "a juridical 
act is a manifestation of will intended to have legal consequences"); id. art. 3471 cmt. (c) 
(West 1994) (stating "[a] juridical act is a lawful volitional act intended to have legal 
consequences"); id. art. 3483 cmt. (b) (stating a juridical act is "a licit act intended to have 
legal consequences''). 
105. A jurid cal act that contains the declarations of will of multiple persons may still 
be a unilateral juridical act if those wills are "parallel and cast in the same direction." SADL 
LITVINOFF & w. THOMAS TITE, LoUISIANA LEGAL l'RANSACITONS: THE CIVIL LAW OF 
JURIDICAL ACTS 144 (1969). Examples of such acts are a procuration issued jointly by 
several principals naming the same representative or a joint renunciation of a servitude by the 
co-owners of the dominant estate. 
106. See LA. CIV. CooE ANN. arts. 626 (West 1980) (renunciation of usufruct); id. arts. 
737, 77_1:772 (renunciation of predial servitudes); id. arts. 1014-1015 (West 1952) (renunc� on by heirs); id. art: 1802 (renunciation of solidarity); id. art. 2348 (West 1985) (renunciation ?Y. a spouse of �ght to concur in management decisions); id. art. 3029 (West 
1994) (renu�ct�tion of authonty by mandatary); id. arts. 3449-3451 (renunciation of right to 
pie� pr�ption); see also id. art. 2339 (West 1985) (declaration by a spouse reserving the 
fruits o� his ?r her separate property); _ i�: arts. 3433-3434 (West 1994) (abandonment of possess1�n); id. arts. 3424-3425 (acqu1S1tion of possession); id. art. 3418 (acquisition of ownership of3:° abandoned movab�e by occupancy); id. art. 977 (West 1952) (acceptance of a su�ss1on�; id. art. 1559 (revocation ofa donation); id. art. 368 (West 1993) (emancipation of a nnnor); id. �- 1944 � est 1987) <."offer of reward made to the public") . 
. 
107. Traditional c.1vt! law terrrunology subdivides unilateral juridical acts into those which are and those which are not addressed to a particular recipient. See Toussis note 21, at 379. A procuration is an example of the former category. See LA av' ��": ANN. art. 2987 (West Sup�. 1999). The abandonment of possession and the a� uisition � occup�cy of the ownership of an abandoned movable are examples of the latt q t 
y 
The un1l�t�l �ature of these acts is more clearly visible in cases of the latt:. �:�
g
�ry
. 
because 1t 1s easier to see how these acts become operational how th od th · 
g 
ry without the assent or participation of any other party. 
• 
ey pr uce e1r effects,
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between him and the principal comes into existence.108 What then are 
the practical consequences of classifying the procuration as a unilateral 
act if, by its nature, this act is bound to evolve into a bilateral act? A 
complete answer to this question belongs to the realm of the law of 
obligations and is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say, 
however, that one consequence is that the procuration's existence, 
validity, and interpretation will be judged by focusing exclusively on 
the principal 's person and expression of will, and not the 
representative's. Another consequence is more clearly visible in cases 
in which, as permitted by article 2988, the procuration is 
communicated not to the representative but to a third party with whom 
the representative is authorized to deal. In such a case, the principal 
may, in certain circumstances, be bound by the procuration even 
before the representative has knowledge of it and thus before he can 
express a will to act pursuant thereto. For example, A, unbeknown to 
B, publishes in a newspaper an announcement appointing B as A's 
"general representative" in a specified locality. Pursuant to this 
announcement, C serves B with process in a suit directed against A, 
which process B accepts without knowing its contents. In such a case, 
in the absence of contrary statutory provisions, the service of process 
is binding on A, although there is no contract between A and B. 
5. Coexistence of Procuration and Mandate 
As said above, once the representative accepts the procuration, a 
contract is formed between him and the person who issued the 
procuration. Although that contract need not be a mandate, in most 
cases it is likely to be. Thus, procuration and mandate are likely to 
coexist in many cases. However, even when they do not coexist, the 
two acts will be governed for the most part by the same rules. This 
flows from new article 2988 which provides that "[a] procuration is 
subject to the rules governing mandate to the extent that the[ir] 
application . . .  is compatible with the nature of the procuration."109 
108. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2987 cmt. (d) (West Supp. 1999). "The recipient of 
the procuration does not bind himself to do anything. However, ifhe accepts the procuration 
or acts accordingly, a contract may be formed between the principal and the representative. 
This contract may be a mandate or another nominate contract." Id. This comment might be 
slightly misleading to the extent it implies that the "recipient of the procuration" and the 
person who "accepts the procuration or acts accordingly" need be the same person. 
However, as the text of the article states, this is not necessary because the procuration may be 
addressed either to the representative or to a third party. In the latter case, it is the 
representative's act, not that of the third party that would result in a contract "between the 
principal and the representative." Id. 
1 09. Id. art. 2988. 
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The comments amplify this provision by stating that ''the obligations 
of the principal and the representative toward each other, the rights and 
obligations of the principal and the representative toward third 
persons, and the tennination of the power of attorney are determined 
by analogous application of the rules governing mandate."1 10 This 
supplemental and analogical application of the articles on mandate is 
both necessary and proper. It is necessary because, unlike other 
modem civil codes, the new Act has not taken the bolder step of 
regulating in detail representation and procuration. It is also proper 
because, unlike those modem civil codes but like the French and the 
old Louisiana civil codes, the new Act continues to view mandate as a 
relationship whose primary function is the mandatary's representation 
of the principal. 
III. MANDATE 
A. General Principles 
Art 2989. Mandate defined 
A mandate is a contract by which a person, the principal, confers 
authority on another person, the mandatary, to transact one or more 
affeirs for the principal. 1 1 1  
I .  Mandate Is a Contract 
Article 2989 defines mandate as a contract, that is, an 
"agreement by two or more parties,"1 12 which is "formed by the 
consent of the parties established through offer and acceptance."1 1 3 
Although article 2989 does not specifically require acceptance by the 
mandatary, 1 14 this requirement flows easily from the very use of the 
�ord "contract" as well as from the next article, article 2990, which 
mcorporates by reference all the general rules of contracts including 
those pertaining to offer and acceptance. 1 1 5 One of these
' 
articles is 
article 1927, which �rovi��s that, in principle, "offer and acceptance 
may be made orally, m wnting, or by action or inaction. "1 1 6 
. 
De�g
. 
�andate as a contract distinguishes it from the 
urulateral Jundical act of procuration, a distinction which was 
I IO. Id. art. 2988 cmt. 
1 1 1 . Id. art. 2989. 
1 1 2. Id. art. 1 906 (West 1987). 
1 1 3. Id. art. 1927. 
1 14. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN art 2988 (1 870) (st tin th " is completed only by the acceptance
.
ofthe mand t 
"
) 
a g at [t]he contract of mandate 
1 1 5. LA. av. CODE ANN. art. 2990 (West�
�
 
i999) 1 16. Id. art. 1 927 (West 1987). 
· · 
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discussed earlier. 1 1 7 More importantly, defining mandate as a contract 
helps distinguish it from the common-law institution of agency which 
can come into existence even in the absence of a contract between the 
principal and the agent. Generally speaking, in civil-law systems, in 
the absence of such a contract, one is not bound by the juridical acts of 
another. Moreover, the existence of such a contract does not suffice 
for holding the principal bound to the juridical acts of the mandatary. 
It is necessary that these acts must have been within the mandatary's 
authority as conferred by the principal. 1 18 As will be explained later, 
the new Act reaffirms both of these civilian principles1 19 but also 
introduces exceptions to them. Thus, according to new article 3021,  
"[ o ]ne who causes a third person to believe that another person is  his 
mandatary is bound to the third person who in good faith contracts 
with the putative mandatary."120 This article can apply in two 
situations: (1 )  when there is no contract at all between the putative 
principal and the putative mandatary and (2) when there is such a 
contract, but it does not confer on the mandatary the authority to enter 
into the particular contract with the third person. In either case, the 
principal will be bound under article 3021 ,  and in both cases the basis 
for his liability will be extra-contractual and similar to what common­
law systems call "apparent authority" or "agency by estoppel."121 
2. Object of Mandate 
According to article 2989, in a contract of mandate the principal 
"confers authority" on the mandatary "to transact one or more affairs 
for the principal."122 The comments accompanying this article 
explain that the word "affairs" encompasses both juridical and 
material acts. 1 23 Indeed, to transact effectively juridical acts for the 
principal, a mandatary may have to cany out certain incidental and 
sometimes not so incidental material acts. This is why it would have 
been unwise to limit mandate to the performance of juridical acts. 124 
Nevertheless, a question worth exploring is whether a mandate in 
which the mandatary's authority is confined to performing only 
material acts is truly a mandate, or whether it is instead another 
1 1 7. See supra notes 101-1 06 and accompanying text. 
118. See, e.g. , LA. CIV. CODE art. 3010 (1870); FR. c. CN. arts. 1989, 1998; BGB 
§§ 164, 177; GREEK CIV. CODE arts. 211, 229; ITALY C.c. arts. 1388, 1398. 
119. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3008, 3010, 3019, 3020 (West Supp. 1999). 
120. Id. art. 3021. 
121. See infra Part IIl.C.2. 
122. Id. art. 2989 (emphasis added). 
123. See id. art. 2989 cmts. (d)-(e); supra notes 97 & 100 and accompanying text. 
1 24. See id. art. 2989 cmt. (e). 
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contract. This other contract can be an employment contract creating 
a master-servant relationship, 125 or it can be contract for ''work by the 
job,"126 referred to as contract for services. 
a. Mandate vs. Employment Contract 
Distinguishing a mandate from the master-servant relationship 
is important for many reasons. Not the least of which is the fact that 
while a master is liable for the offenses and quasi-offenses of his 
servants, 127 a principal as such is never delictually liable for the 
offenses or quasi-offenses of the mandatary, unless o f  course the 
mandatary is also the principal 's servant. 128 The difference between 
these two relationships has been discussed repeatedly by Louisiana 
courts which have clearly articulated the criteria for distinguishing 
between the two. 129 Thus, according to the Louisiana Supreme 
Court's decision in Blanchard v. Ogima, these criteria include one 
party's right to control the activities of the other party, the degree of 
control regarding the time and space elements of those activities, and 
the existence of a close economic relationship between the two 
parties. 130 Thus, as the court said: 
Although a servant may possess the qualities of an agent, all agents 
do not qualify as servants. . . .  Employer-employee status may be 
included within the master-servant relation, but principal-agent status 
cannot unless the agent is also a servant. . . . "Servant" must be 
interpreted as that particular kind of agent who has a very close 
ec?n�mic relation t�, and is subject to very close control by. the 
p�c1pal: A servant is o�e who offers his personal services for a price. 
He 1s an mtegral part of his employer 's business and must submit to the 
control of his physical conduct as well as of his time. A non-servant 
agent contributes to the business of his employer, but he is not such a 
125. See id. arts. 2746-2750. 
126. See id. art. 2756 (West 1996); see also id. arts. 2756-2777 ( I · th 
contracts). 
regu atmg ese 
127. See id. art. 2320. 
128. See 1:3lanchard v. Og�a, 215 So. 2d 902, 904, 906 (La 1 968). 129. _See id. at 905; Aup1ed v. Joudeh, 694 So. 2d 1012 1 0 1 6  (La Ct A 1 997)· OD��O Oii & Gas Co. v. Nunez, 532 So. 2d 453 462-6 ' . pp. ' 
L?�1s1ana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 53 1 So. 2d 5 0 1
' 
503-o! 
(
(
ta Ct. App. 1 988); Adams v. 
L1vmgston Parish Sch. Bd., 438 So. 2d 1 141 1 144
• a Ct. App. 1 988); Hebert v. 
Durbin, 41�
,
So: 2d 620, 627-28 (La. Ct. App. j 982). 
(La Ct. App. 1 983); Young Oil Co. v. 
130. It 1s the right of control of the time and h . . . . . the existence of a close relationship betwee th 
p y�1cal ac�v1ties m the other party and 
servant." Blanchanl, 2 1 5  So. 2d at 905. 
n e parties which detemune that one is a 
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part of it that his physical acts and the time to be devoted to the 
business are subject to control.131  
The above criteria were as sound under the old law as they are 
under the new law. Thus, the distinction between mandate and 
employment contracts should not pose any problems for Louisiana 
courts under the new Act. 
b. Mandate vs. Contract for Services 
In contrast, the distinction between mandate and a contract of 
services is more difficult because in both of these contracts the right 
and degree of control over the other party's activities that 
characterizes the master-servant relationship is lacking. Yet this 
distinction has practical ramifications on the parties' rights and 
duties, including the right to unilaterally terminate the contract. 
Before suggesting an answer to this question under the new Act, 
it may be helpful to briefly survey the answer given by other civil 
codes. For example, the Italian132 and the Dutch civil codes133 limit the 
scope of mandate to the transaction of')uridical acts" for the principal. 
Thus, under these codes, a contract calling for the performance of only 
material acts is simply not a mandate. The German and Greek civil 
codes provide that a mandate may encompass material acts134 but, in 
keeping with the Roman law origin of this institution, define mandate 
as necessarily gratuitous.135 Thus, under these codes, a remunerative 
contract, regardless of its scope, cannot be a mandate. The Frencr.t 
Code civil departed from the Roman law tradition by providing that a 
mandate is gratuitous but only in the absence of a contrary 
agreement.1 36 Thus, under this code, the question of distinguishing 
remunerative mandates from contracts for services depends on what 
one considers as the essential elements of mandate. In turn, this 
question depends on the definition of mandate provided in Code civil 
article 1984, which defines mandate as a contract in which the 
principal grants to the mandatary "le pouvoir de faire quelque chose 
1 3 1 .  Id. at 906-07. 
1 32. See ITALY C.c. art. 1703. 
133. See BW bk. 7, art. 400. This article recognizes the need for distinguishing 
between the two contracts and defines mandate in a way that avoids overlap with 
employment contracts. It defines mandate as "a contract whereby one party, the mandatary, 
binds himself toward the other party, the mandator, to perform one or more juridical acts on 
account of the mandator without being a relationship of employment." Id. (emphasis added). 
1 34. See § 662 BGB; GREEK CIV. CODE art. 7 13. 
1 3  5. See infra note 172. 
1 36. See FR. C. CIV. art. 1986. 
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,,137 Whil th d " h 
,, 
(thin ) pour le mandant et en son nom. e e wor c ose g 
encompasses both juridical and material acts, the words ''pouvoir" 
(power) and "en son nom" (in his name) seem to confine the scope of 
mandate to juridical acts,138 and the Cour de Cassation, France's 
highest court of ordinary jurisdiction has so held. 139 Thus, under 
French law, a contract does not qualify as mandate unless: (a) it 
confers the power to enter into juridical acts, and (b) these acts are to 
be entered into by the mandatary "in the name" of the principal. 
Conversely, a contract that authorizes only material acts or juridical 
acts that are not to be conducted in the name of the principal is not a 
mandate. 
Until the enactment of the new Act, the pertinent codal 
provisions in Louisiana were virtually identical to the corresponding 
French provisions.140 The Code Napoleon of 1 804 defined mandate as 
a contract which is only presumptively gratuitous141 and in which the 
principal grants to the mandatary "le pouvoir . . .  de faire quelque 
chose pour le mandat et en son nom. "142 The same definitions were 
reproduced in the Digest of 1 808, except that the word chose was 
changed to ajfaires, the English translation of which was carried over 
into the Civil Code of 1 870.143 In 194 7, however, the words "and in 
his name" were effectively read out by the Louisiana Supreme Court 
in Sentell v. Richardson, 144 thus introducing the concept of undisclosed 
agency which is now codified by the new Act.145 
As will be explained later, the introduction of undisclosed agency 
to Louisiana was both inevitable and useful. However, this 
development eliminated one of the two French criteria for 
. 137. Id. art. 1 984; supra note 74 ("the power to do something for the principal and in hls name"). 
. . .
138. A
.� 
Planiol concludes, "[t]he use of the word 'power' implies that it has to do with JUnd1cal acts. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 32, § 2232, at 287 n.2. 
13?,· See Judgment of Feb. 19, 1968, Cass. Civ. I re, [1 968) Bull. Civ. No. 69 at 54-55 (Fr.). n y a rrz:i.n��t lorsque des personnes chargent une autre d 'accomp/ir ;our leur 
�o'!'pte un �cte 1un�1.que, . . . et non des actes materiels, sans pouvoir de re resentation elements qui caractensent le contrat d 'entreprise .
. . .  " ["There is a mandate �hen rson� charge another to ac�omplish for their
_ 
account a juridical act, and not material acts �thout power of representation, elements which characterize the contract for services "] 'd at 55 (emphasis added). · · · · · 11 • 
140. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2991 ( 1 870); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2960 ( 1 825) 141. See CODE NAPOLEON art. 1986 ( 1 804) (Comp. ed 1972) 
. 
142. Id. art. 1 984 ("the power to d h · r 
. . 
(emphasis added). 
· · · 0 somet mg ror the principal and in his name") 
1972;.
43 . See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2954 (1 825); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2985 ( 1 870) (Comp. ed. 
144. 29 So: 2d 852, 855-56 (La. 1947). 145. See discussion infra Part III.A.3. 
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distinguishing between mandate and a remunerative contract of 
services and thus has reduced the usefulness of the French doctrine in 
fonnulating the proper Louisiana answer to the above question. Thus, 
in contrast to the prevailing French solution, in Louisiana, under both 
post-Sentell jurisprudence and the new Act: (1) a contract in which 
one party instructs the other to act in the former party's name 
continues to qualify as a mandate, but (2) a contract in which one party 
instructs the other party to act in the latter party's name may or may 
not qualify as a mandate. Whether or not it does so qualify will 
depend on the meaning attributable to the word "affairs" and the 
surrounding words used in new article 2988. 
As said above, both the etymology and the history of the word 
"affairs" leave no doubt that it encompasses not only juridical but also 
material acts. Thus, a contract in which the principal authorizes both 
types of acts can clearly qualify as a mandate contract, whether or not 
the acts are to be performed in the principal's name. On the other 
hand, it is submitted that a contract should not be considered a 
mandate: (1) if it calls for the performance of exclusively material acts 
and (2) if those acts are not to be performed in the name of the 
principal. 146 1bis solution finds support in the tenor of new article 
2989, especially in the use of the words "authority" and ''transact," 
both of which indicate that what is contemplated is juridical acts.147 
fudeed, material acts are not ''transacted" but are rather performed or 
carried out. Similarly, one does not speak of "authority" to perform 
material acts. Thus, it is not a coincidence that the quoted term is not 
used in any of the Civil Code articles providing for contracts for 
services.148 Additional support can be found in the comments 
accompanying article 2989 and in at least one other article of the new 
Act, article 2999. After explaining that the word "affairs" may 
encompass both juridical and material acts, the comments to article 
2989 draw attention to the fact that "most of the provisions on 
mandate have been drafted with the making of juridical acts in 
mind."149 One of these provisions is new article 2999 which provides 
that "[a] person of limited capacity may act as a mandatary for matters 
1 46. The gratuitous or remunerative character of the contract could also be an 
additional but not determinative criterion. 
147. See LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 2989 (West Supp. 1999). 
1 48. See, e.g., LA. CN. CoDE ANN. art. 2675 (West 1996) (defining a lease of labor or 
industry as "a contract by which one of the parties binds himself to do something for the 
other, in consideration of a certain price"); id. art. 2756 (defining a contract of work by the 
job as a contract in which one ''undertake[s] a building or a work for a certain stipulated 
price"). 
149. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2989 cmt. (e) (West Supp. 1999). 
1 1 1 8 TULANE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 73 : 1087 
for which he is capable of contracting."150 This provision would
. 
h�ve 
been unnecessary if the Act contemplated mandates cons1stmg 
exclusively of material acts. 
3. Undisclosed Mandate 
As said earlier, the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, like its French 
counterpart, defined mandate as being necessarily representative, that 
is, as requiring that the mandatary act in the principals. name. '5 1  This 
requirement has been eliminated by the jurisprudence smce 1947, thus 
importing to Louisiana the common-law concept of undisclosed 
agency.152 Appropriately recognizing the tremendous usefulness of 
this concept but also acknowledging the existing reality, the new Act 
codifies this jurisprudence. Thus, article 2989 omits any reference to 
this requirement, while articles 3017-301 8 and 3022-3023 provide for 
the fully or partially disclosed mandate. 1 53 
4. Mandate vs. Agency 
While the introduction of undisclosed agency and the recognition 
of the concept of apparent authority154 have brought Louisiana 
mandate law closer to the common law institution of agency, there are 
still some differences between the Louisiana law of mandate and the 
common law of agency. These differences are noted at the appropriate 
places in the discussion that follows. 
5. Applicability of Law of Obligations 
Art. 2990. Applicability of the rules governing obligations 
In all matters for which no special provision is made in this Title, the 
contract of mandate is governed by the Titles of "Obligations in 
General" and "Conventional Obligations or Contracts. 111 55 
. Article 2?9.0 restates the obvious, namely, that because mandate ts a contract, 1t ts governed by the general rules on contracts for all 
matte� for �hi�h the special rules on mandate do not provide 
otherwise. S�1�arly, because, like any other contract, a mandate 
generates obbgabons, those obligations are governed by the rules 
1 50. Id. art. 2999 (emphasis added). 
1 5 1 .  See LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2985 ( 1 870). 152. See Sentell v. Richardson, 29 So. 2d 852 (La 1947) 153. See in.franotes 3 12-329, 406-415 and accom an .0· 154. See infra notes 3 75-405 and accom . 
p YI 
. 
g tex�. 
art. 3021 (West Supp. 1999). 
panymg text dtscussmg LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 
1 55. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2990 (West Supp. 1999). 
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found in the title of the Civil Code entitled "Obligations in General," 
with regard to all matters not provided for in the title on Mandate. 
This cross-reference helps avoid repetition. For example, it 
explains why the new Act does not reproduce former articles 2988-
2990 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 870 which dealt with acceptance 
and its modalities. These matters are now governed by Civil Code 
articles 1927-1947 on contract formation.156 Similarly, the failure to 
reproduce former article 2987, which provided that "[t]he object of the 
mandate must be lawful" and that the power conferred "must be one 
which the principal himself has the right to exercise,"157 is also 
inconsequential because the same principles are contained in the 
general rules on conventional obligations1 58 which are rendered 
applicable through the cross-reference contained in article 2990. Also 
rendered applicable through this cross-reference are some more basic 
principles such as the self-evident notion that strictly personal 
obligations, being nondelegable, 1 59 cannot be the object of a mandate. 
6. Interest Served 
Art 2991. Interest served 
The contract of mandate may serve the exclusive or the common 
interest of the principal, the mandatary, or a third person.160 
Article 299 1 states essentially the same rule as pre-Revision 
Code article 2986161 which had attracted relatively little 
jurisprudential attention. Whether the mandate serves the exclusive 
interest of only one party, as opposed to the common interest of two 
or more, may be significant primarily in two contexts. First, to the 
extent that both the principal and the mandatary have an interest in 
the subject of the mandate, the potential of a conflict of interest 
arises. In that event, consistent with the general status of the 
mandatary as a fiduciary, 162 such conflicts are to be resolved in 
accordance with the overriding obligation of good faith imposed by 
the Code.163 
156. See LA. av. CODE ANN. arts. 1927-1947 (West 1987). 
157. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2987 ( 1870). 
158. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1 769, 1 966, 1971, 2030 (West 1987). 
159. See id. art. 1 766 (defining "strictly personal" obligations). 
160. LA. av. CODE ANN. art. 2991 (West Supp. 1 999). 
1 6 1 .  Compare id. , with LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2986 (1 870) (repealed 1997). 
162. See infra notes 265-278 and accompanying text. 
163. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1759 (West 1987); id. arts. 2991 cmt. (b), 3001 cmt. 
(b) (West Supp. 1 999). 
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Second, to the extent that the mandataiy has an interest in the 
mandate, questions may arise as to its revocability by the principal. 
Under pre-Revision law, the principal could generally revoke a 
mandate at will. 1 64 The former code also made reference to 
"irrevocable powers of attomey."165 In tum, the jurisprudence adopted 
the common law institution of an irrevocable "agency coupled with an 
interest." According to Montgomery v. Foreman, the leading case on 
this issue, such an agency would be created when the mandatary had 
such an interest in the subject of the mandate that "the contract 
containing the mandate is a bilateral or synallagmatic agreement,"166 in 
which event the principal cannot revoke the mandate without just 
cause. As stated by the court, ''when the authority of mandate over a 
thing is given in part as security for monies advanced or obligations 
incurred by the mandatary, or is necessary to effectuate such security, 
then it would be inequitable to allow the principal to revoke the 
mandate at will."167 
Regarding termination, new article 3025 now provides that "[a] 
mandate in the interest of the principal, and also of the mandatary or of 
a third party, may be irrevocable, if the parties so agree . . . . "168 
Although the general topic of termination is beyond this article's 
scope, a few brief observations on this article are in order. First, the 
comments accompanying the article do not elaborate on the type of 
'interest' the mandatary mu�t have to trigger application of the article, 
but Montgomery and other Jurisprudence will likely be looked to by 
analogy. 
Second, the article's requirement that in addition to the 
?1andatary's interest, an agreement is nece�sary for creating an 
rrrevo�able �andate departs from, and narrows considerably, the rule 
enunciated m Montgomery. On the other hand, the fact that an 
��
· 
�
e �A. Civ
C 
· CoDE ANN. art. 3027(AX1 )  ( 1 870) (repealed 1 997) . A. IV. ODE ANN. art. 3028 (1 870) (repealed 1997) 
. 
166. 410 So. 2d l l60 1 1 67 (La Ct A 1 982) 
· 
Agency-Revocabi/ity of PoV:er of Sale Co�pl 'j
·
Wt 
h · 
/
ee generally John C. Werhan, Note, 
167. Montgomery, 4 1 0  So. 2d at 1 16; 
.r{.� �n nterest, 4 LA. L. �v. 60 1  ( 1942). 
in the exercise of the mandate, such as a co 
· . .1s is to be �ontrasted with a simple interest 
test, the court concluded that an agreement 
�ss1on or contmgency fee. On the basis of this 
gav� �e agen.t the right to develop the prop�rty 
een��downers and a real estate agent which 
remitting a minimum amount per runnin 
ti a� is sole expense and to sell the property, 
an agency coupled with an interest. See i�. �
o
l
t 
1�7-6� 
owners and retaining the balance, was 
. . 16�. LA. CIV. CODE .ANN. art. 3025 
· 
this is simply an exception to the g 1 
(West Supp. 1 999) (emphasis added). Of course 
freely. See id. cmt. (b ). 
enera power of the principal to terminate the mandate 
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agreement c an  be implied from the circumstances169 may limit the 
breadth or significance of the change. 
Finally, in cases where the mandate is for the interest of a third 
party, the article's requirement that an agreement between ''the parties" 
is necessary for making the mandate irrevocable is ambiguous. Does 
the article contemplate an agreement between the principal and the 
mandatary, or an agreement between the principal and the third party? 
It seems that either answer would be an innovation to present 
Louisiana law. 
7. Onerous or Gratuitous Contract 
Art 2992. Onerous or Gratuitous Contract 
The contract of mandate may be either onerous or gratuitous. It is 
gratuitous in the absence of contrary agreement.1 70 
Article 2992 "reproduces the substance of Civil Code Article 
2991 (1 870),"171 which followed the French solution of departing from 
the Roman law tradition under which a mandate was a necessarily 
gratuitous contract. 172 What remains from that tradition is merely a 
presumption that mandate is gratuitous, 173 a presumption which can be 
rebutted by contrary agreement. Under general contract principles, 
this agreement can be express or tacit and can be inferred from the 
surrounding circumstances or conventional usages.174 Indeed, the 
decision of some European civil codes such as the German and Greek 
to define mandate as a necessarily gratuitous contract' 75 was not only 
unrealistic when made and especially thereafter, but has also resulted 
in rendering almost useless the whole institution of mandate. The 
French and the Louisiana codes have made a wiser choice in this 
regard, and the new Act has continued that tradition. 
169. See LA. av. CODE ANN. art. 2054 (West 1987). 
170. LA. av. CODE ANN. art. 2992 (West Supp. 1999). 
17 1 .  See id. art. 2992 cmt. 
172. See DIG. 1 7  . 1 .4 (Paul, Ad Edictum 32) ( "Mandatum nisi gratuitum nullum est. "). 
For discussion of the gratuitous nature of mandate under Roman law, as well as the 
exceptions from and subsequent evolution of that principle, see BUCKLAND, supra note 12, at 
5 14- 18; ZIMMERMANN, supra note 12, at 41 3-20. 
173. If the mandate is gratuitous, then the mandatary is treated less stringently. See 
LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 3002 (West Supp. 1 999) (providing that "[w]hen the mandate is 
gratuitous, the court may reduce the amount of loss for which the mandatary is liable"). 
1 74. See, e.g., LA. av. CooE ANN. arts. 2054-2055 (West 1987). 
175 .  See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text. 
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8. Form 
Art. 2993. Form 
The contract of mandate is not required to be in any particular form. 
Nevertheless when the law prescribes a certain form for an act, a I 
• 176 mandate authorizing the act must be m that form. 
a. Form and "Equal Dignity" 
The comments to article 2993 aver that it "reproduces the 
substance of Article 2992 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 870."177 
This is true of the first sentence of the new article, which indeed is 
essentially the equivalent of former article 2992. '78 The second 
sentence of the new article, however, enunciates a substantive rule 
which has no counterpart in the former code articles, although it is 
firmly grounded in the jurisprudence. According to this 
jurisprudence, whenever the extrinsic law demands that an act be in a 
certain form, the authority of a mandatary to consununate that act for 
his principal must be in the same form. 1 79 That rule in tum is similar, 
but not identical, to an early common-law agency doctrine, the 
"equal dignity rule," which required an agent's authority to execute 
an instrument to be in writing if the instrument itself was required to 
be in writing. 1 80 
While the general principle espoused by the second sentence has 
been recognized in a long line of opinions,181  the Louisiana Supreme 
Court most recently addressed it in Tedesco v. Gentry Development, 
Inc. 182 In Tedesco, the plaintiffs entered into a written contract to 
purchase immovable property from the defendant corporation, signed 
176. LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 2993 (West Supp. 1 999). 
177. Id. art. 2993 cmt. (a). 
178.. See �A. CIV. Coo� ANN. art. 2992 �1 870) (repealed 1 997) ("A power of attorney 
may be g1ven'.e1ther by a pubhc act �r by � wn�g under private signature, even by letter. It �ay also be given verbally, but of this test1momal proof is admitted only conforrnably to the 
title: Of Conventional Obligations.") . 
. 
�e text of new article 2993 does not address the question of proof of the mandate; the Rev1s1on relegates that question to the comments. See LA. CIV. CooE ANN. art. 2993 cmt.(b) 
(West Supp. 1 999) . 
. 
1 79. See, e.g., Bordelon v. Crabtree, 43 So. 2d 682, 683 (La. 1 949); Ward v. Penmngton, 434 So. 2d l l3 1 ,  1 1 37 (La Ct. App. 1 983); Tchoupitoulas, Inc. v. McCullough 349 So. 2d 346, 346-47 (La Ct. App. 1 977); Krupp v. Nelson 50 So 2d 464 467 68 (La a' App. 195 1 ). ' . ' - ·
1 80. See HAROLD GILL REuSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A GREGORY THE L AND PARTNERSIIlP § 1 2  (2d ed. 1 990). 
. • AW OF AGENCY 
1 8 1 .  See cases cited supra note 1 79. 
1 82. 540 So. 2d 960 (La 1 989). 
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by the cotporation's president. 183 The court held that the contract was 
unenforceable because the president had no written authority to sell the 
property.1 84 In so doing, the court refused to distinguish between 
actual and apparent authority; in the court's words, "[j]ust as 
testimonial proof cannot be used to prove the sale of immovable 
property (or the agreement to sell such property), testimonial proof 
cannot be used to prove the agent's authority to execute the contract, 
whether that authority was actual or apparent."185 
Although Tedesco was unsurprising, given the prevailing earlier 
jurisprudence, the principal irony in the court's analysis is that it 
perceived a codal basis for this rule where none previously existed. 
The court supported its conclusion1 86 by citing (1) article 2440, which 
requires that a sale or promise of sale of an immovable must be by 
authentic act or act under private signature; 1 87 (2) former article 2996, 
which required express authority "to alienate or give a mortgage, or do 
any other act of ownership;"188 and (3) former article 2997, which 
(extrapolating from the general principle pronounced in former article 
2996) required express authority to, among other things, "sell or to 
buy."189 The flaw in that analysis, however, is that neither of the latter 
two code articles said anything about requiring a writing; they simply 
required express authority which, obviously, can be oral as well as 
written. It is simply a leap of faith to conclude that because article 
2440 requires an agreement to sell immovables to be written, former 
articles 2996 and 2997 required that the express authority to execute 
such an agreement as buyer or seller must be in writing as well. No 
such conclusion is inexorably compelled by logical interpretation of 
the then existing provisions of the Civil Code. 
Neither the Tedesco court, nor the drafters of new article 2993 
articulate the policy underlying the adoption of this rule. It is one 
thing for the legislature to determine that, because of various 
considerations associated with certain transactions, sound policy 
dictates the imposition of certain formality requirements as a 
precondition to their enforceability. Indeed, borrowing from their 
English common law heritage and that country's 1672 "Statute against 
183. See id. at 961 .  
184. See id. at 965. 
1 85.  Id. at 964. Related issues involving apparent authority are discussed infra notes 
375-405. 
186. See Tedesco, 540 So. 2d at 964. 
187. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2440 (West 1996). 
188. LA. Crv. ConE .ANN. art. 2996 (1870) (repealed 1997). 
189. Id. art. 2997, amended by 1981 La Acts. 1337 (repealed 1997). 
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Frauds and Perjuries,"190 all of the common-law states have some fonn 
of general statute of frauds, requiring a signed, written memorandwn 
for certain agreements to be enforceable,191 as w�ll as other specific 
statutes of .frauds.192 It is, however, not self-evident that the same 
policies always justify imposing the . s�e requirements .for the contract of mandate by which authonty is granted to satisfy the 
signature requirement attached to the underlying substantive 
transactions. If we are to sanction the frustration of a party's 
expectation based upon his failure to obtain written evidence193 of a 
mandatary's authority to bind his principal, it would seem appropriate 
to identify some good reason for so doing, given that this can be a 
classic ''trap for the unwary." Frankly, it is difficult in many instances 
to see what that reason is. 
In that regard, it is also important to note that the rule of article 
2993 is contrary to that of the modem common law. Under the early 
common law, it was clear that, for instruments required to be under 
seal, sealed authority of an agent was generally likewise required.194 
The significance of the seal, however, has generally been abolished.195 
Thus, in common law states, unless there is a specific statute requiring 
written authorization of certain transactions,196 written authority is not 
necessary for the execution of a writing.197 Simply put, the "equal 
dignity rule" no longer generally obtains under modem common law 
doctrine. In this respect, then, the Revision does not move Louisiana 
law towards the national commercial mainstream. Instead it arguably 
creates a minefield, especially for out-of-state lawyers. 
1 90. See Statute Against Frauds and Perjuries, 1672, 24 Car. 2, ch. 3 (Eng.). 
1 9 1 .  See, e.g., Miss. CooE ANN. § 1 5-3- 1  ( 1972) (a traditional English-style statute). 
1 92 . .  For exampl�, all st�es other �an Louisiana have adopted § 2-201 of the Uniform 
Commercial C�e, which requrres a wntten memorandum for all contracts for the sale of 
goods for the pnce of$500 or more. See U.C.C. § 2-201(1). 
_193. Of course, other formalities beyond a simple writing may I fi I 
notanal act. 
app y, or examp e, 
1 94. See, e.g. , RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 28 HANDBOOK OF TIIE LAW OF AGENCY § 19, at 35 (1 964). 
(1 958); WARREN SEAVY, 
195. See, e.g. , MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75_9_1 to 75_9_7 
196. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2309 (D . 
. . . 
enter into a contract required by law to be 
. . ti 
eenng 1 985) (p�ovtdtng that "authority to 
CODE ANN. § 1 5-3-1 ( 1972) (requirin tha�= 
ng c� �nly be given . . . in writing''); MISS. 
party to be charged or "some [other]
g 
perso b 
tra�_
ts within the statute of frauds signed by the 
writing"). 
n Y tm or her thereunto lawfully authorized in 
In some other states however th . 
· h · 
' 
• ere is no statutory · WTJtten aut onty to execute contracts sub. 
requirement that an agent have 
OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney Supp. 1 9i�)
t to the statute of frauds. See, e.g. , N.Y. GEN. 
197. See RESTATEMENT' supra note 1 94 § 3 1 . 1 80, § 12; SEAVY, supra note 1 94, § 1 9, at 36.
' 0( ), REUSCHI..EIN & GREGORY, supra note 
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b. Application of the Rule 
The comments to article 2993 offer two examples of the 
application of the rule as to form.198 First, because donations must be 
by authentic act,199 a mandate authorizing a mandatary to make a 
donation must also be by authentic act. 200 Second, because an act of 
compromise must be written,201 a mandate authorizing a mandatary to 
execute a compromise must likewise be in writing.202 
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, however, the choice of 
these examples may have the unfortunate effect of obscuring the area 
in which the rule of form has been clearly the most important, which 
is transactions in immovable property. Virtually all of the reported 
cases dealing with this question have involved either transfers of 
immovable property under article 1839203 or contracts for the sale of 
immovables under article 2440,204 although one pre-Revision case 
extended the rule to contracts of suretyship205 under article 1847.206 
Practically speaking, it is the stability of transactions in immovables 
that is most threatened by the application o f  the rule of form, and 
which should be most strongly emphasized in discussions of the rule. 
The above does not exhaust the possibilities for applying article 
2993, which will depend upon the sweep with which courts interpret 
its reach. Another obvious example is negotiable instruments. Under 
the Louisiana commercial laws, a negotiable instrument must, by its 
nature, be in writing because it must be subject to being possessed, 
198. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN . art. 2993 cmt. (c) (West Supp. 1 999). 
199. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 536 (West 1 987). Indeed, this is one context in 
which the rule of form has logic. The law requires an authentic act for an inter vivos 
donation because the donor is depleting his patrimony without receiving anything in return, 
and thus the authentic act encourages contemplation of the consequences of his acts. If the 
donor seeks to accomplish the donation through a mandatary, requiring an authentic act for 
the mandate thus serves the same function. 
200. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2993 cmt. {c) (West Supp. 1 999). 
201 .  See LA. CIV. CooE ANN. art. 3071 (West 1 994). 
202. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2993 cmt. (c) (West Supp. 1 999). 
203. See id. art. 1 839. Of course, the second sentence of article 1 839 makes an oral 
transfer enforceable between the parties if the transferor admits it under oath. See id. Thus, 
logically, if the transferor is the principal and admits under oath that he orally authorized his 
mandatary to make the transfer, the lack of written authorization might likewise be cured. No 
such mechanism exists with respect to a mandatary of the transferee, however. 
204. See LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2440 (West 1 996). 
205. Fleet Fin., Inc. v. Loan Arranger, Inc., 604 So. 2d 656, 658-59 (La Ct. App. 
I�� . 
. 
206. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 847 (West 1 987) (prohibiting the proof of promises 
to pay a debt of a third person or promises to pay a debt extinguished by prescription by parol 
evidence). 
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transferred, negotiated, and so forth.201 Thus, it would �pear .
that 
article 2993, read literally, could be construed to reqwre wntten 
authority for a mandata.Iy to execute a negotiable instrwnent for his 
principal. Whether this is consistent with current usage is highly 
questionable. 
9. Authority 
Art 2994. General authority 
The principal may confer on the mandatary general authority to do 
h . . ,J th . t 208 w atever zs appropnate unuer e czrcums ances. 
The comment under article 2994 states that "[t]his provision 
resolves questions concerning the validity of a mandate conferring 
general authority. "209 However, as far as can be ascertained, no such 
questions have arisen, if only because the old article 2995, which is 
cited as the source of the new article, provided categorically that the 
mandate "may vest an indefinite power to do whatever may appear 
conducive to the interest of the principal."210 In any event, the new 
article obviates questions as to whether some expression or 
specification of authority granted is essential to a mandate. Thus, a 
mandatary could be hired as "general manager" of a business without 
further elaboration, and thereby receive the authority to perform all 
acts appropriate to that position. Such authority would also include 
that created by implication under new article 2995 ,  which is 
discussed below. 21 1  
It should b e  noted that the common law uses th e  concept of 
"general agency" in a much different sense. At common law, a 
"general agent" is one "authorized to conduct a series of transactions 
involving a continuity of service."212 The emphasis is on continuity of 
service; the degree of discretion of the general agent can be very 
limited in scope.213 
�?1· S�
,
e LA. �V. ��AT. �· §§ 10:3- 1 0 1 to 1 0:3-807 (West 1993). For example, the de�mtton of negotiation 1s a transfer of possession, whether voluntary or involuntary, of an mstru�ent by a person other than �e issuer to a person who thereby becomes its holder." Id. § 10.3-20l(a). The former version of the U C  C adopted · L · · · 1974 . ed th . . . ., In OUIStana In , mcorporat e nec�sstty of a ''writing" as part of the definition of negotiable instrument, but the present version abandons that as obvious surplusag s L RE s ANN § 10:3-104, repealed by 1992 La Acts 3 165. 
e. ee A. V. TAT. . 
208. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2994 (West Supp. 1 999). 
209. Id. art. 2994 cmt 
210. LA. �IV. CODE art. 2995 (1 870) (repealed 1 997). 21 l .  See mfra notes 2 17-221 and accompanying text. 212. REsTATEMENT, supra note 1 94, § 3( 1 ). 2 13 .  See id. § 3 cmts. (b)-(c). 
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Art. 2995. Incidental, necessary, or professional. acts 
The mandatary may peiform all acts that are incidental to or 
necessary for the peiformance of the mandate. 
The authority granted to a mandatary to peiform an act that is an 
ordinary part of his profession or calling, or an act that follows from 
the nature of his profession or calling, need not be specified.214 
Art. 2996. Authority to a/.ienate, acquire, encumber, or lease 
The authority to alienate, acquire, encumber, or lease a thing must 
be gi.ven expressly. Neither the property nor its location need be 
specifically described.215 
Art. 2997. Express authority required 
Authority also must be given expressly to: 
(1) Make an inter vivas donation. 
(2) Accept or renounce a succession. 
(3) Contract a loan, acknowledge or make remission of a debt, or 
become a surety. 
(4) Draw or endorse promissory notes and negotiable instruments. 
(5) Enter into a compromise or refer a matter to arbitration. 
(6) Make health care decisions, such as surgery, medical expenses, 
nursing home residency, and medication.216 
Articles 2995, 2996, and 2997 are considered together because 
they are inextricably linked, although this may not be self-evident 
from their terms. As explained below, this linkage will inevitably 
create difficulties for Louisiana courts in trying to reconcile the 
tensions created by the interplay of the three articles. 
On the purely doctrinal level, article 2995, as successor to former 
article 3000,217  provides the codal basis for what the common law 
would call an agent's implied authority:21 8  the authority to perform 
acts that are consistent with the principal's express directions though 
not spelled out therein.219 A leading Louisiana case, AAA Tzre & 
214. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2995 (West Supp. 1999). 
215. Id. art. 2996. 
216. Id. art. 2997. 
217. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3000 ( 1 870) (repealed 1997) ("Powers granted to 
persons, who exercise a profession, or fulfill certain functions, of doing any business in the 
ordinary course of affairs to which they are devoted, need not be specified, but are inferred 
from the functions which these mandataries exercise."). 
2 18. Ironically, some cases construing former article 3000 have used it as the basis for 
recognizing apparent, as opposed to implied, authority, a manifestly erroneous conclusion. 
See, e.g. , Radiofone v. Oxford Bldg. Servs., 347 So. 2d 327, 329-30 (La Ct. App. 1 977). 
2 19. See, e.g., SEAVY, supra note 194, § 8. Some commentators suggest !hat there 
may be distinctions between the concepts of implied and incidental authonty. See 
REuscHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 1 80, §§ 14-15. 
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Export, Inc. v. Big Chief Trnck Lines, Inc. ,  defined the concept as 
follows: 
[An agency] is created by implication when, from
. 
�e nature �f the 
principal 's business and the position of the agent within that busmess, 
the agent is deemed to have pennission from the principal t? undertake 
certain acts which are . . .  reasonable and necessary concomitants of the 
agent's express authorization. Implied authority connote� �ssion 
from the principal for the agent to act, though that perrmss1on 1s not 
expressly set forth orally or in writing. Generally, one should look from 
the viewpoint of the princi�al and the agent to determine whether the 
agent has implied authority. 20 
Article 2995, then, reflects the simple reality that one cannot 
expect a principal to enumerate the full range of acts which should 
logically fall within the mandatary's authority. Rather, authority 
must, practically speaking, encompass those acts which the 
mandatary could reasonably believe to be necessary and proper to 
accomplish the purposes expressly directed by the principal.221 
Conversely, articles 2996 and 2997 seem premised on a policy 
determination that authority for the specific transactions included 
therein must never be implied, but rather must without exception be 
express. 
There are at least two difficulties with the above scheme: One 
practical and one theoretical. The practical problem is that, inevitably, 
implied authority under article 2995 will subsume transactions for 
which articles 2996 or 2997 ostensibly demand express authority. 
That tension is well-illustrated by a pre-Revision case, Radio/one v. 
Oxford Building Services.222 In that case, the plaintiff contracted to 
provide a beeper paging service to the defendant through its project 
manager in New Orleans.223 The defendant later sought to repudiate 
the contract, arguing that its manager had no authority from the board 
to make such a contract.224 Citing former article 3000, the court 
concluded that the manager had "apparent authority" (in reality, 
implied authority) to bind the corporation, stating that "[w]ere we to 
require each business dealing with a corporation to be authorized by 
written resolution before recognizing its validity, we would impede the 
220. 385 So. 2d 426, 429 (La. Ct. App. 1 980). 
22 1. See id. Note that, as stated in AAA Tire, authority exists as a function of what the 
mandatary reasonably believes, as opposed to the third person with whom he deals. See id. 
222. 347 So. 2d 327 (La a. App. 1 977). 
223. See id. at 328-29. 
224. See id. at 329. It might be noted that the manager paid the initial charge for the 
pager by his own personal check, although the opinion states that he signed the subscription 
agreement as a representative of Oxford Building Services. See id. at 328-29. 
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flow of commerce .• ms Thus, according to the court, corporations must 
be "liable for contracts entered into by their unauthorized agents when 
the objects of the agreements [are] goods or services the corporation 
might require in the normal conduct of its business."226 
Although the court's characterization of such a species of 
authority as "apparent" is clearly inaccurate, the real value of the 
opinion is the court's remarkably candid observation that, were it 
minded to do so, it could have just as easily struck the contract down 
on the basis of lack of express authority under the former code 
articles. 227 Specifically, the court noted: 
We could reach an opposite result in this case by reasoning the 
agreement in question was the sale of a service and rely on that part of 
C.C. art. 2997, which requires authority to buy and sell to be express. 
But this would defeat the purpose of C.C. art. 3000. We note an 
inconsistency in the spirit in which our courts apply the apparent 
authority the01"1; to validate contracts vis-a-vis the strict proof demand 
to defeat them. 28 
In other words, one lesson of Radio/one is that the unyielding 
demand of articles 2996 and 2997 for express authority, without 
exception, for the enumerated transactions cannot peacefully coexist 
with the recognition of implied authority in article 2995. In fact, 
Radiofone also teaches that the rules of these articles are clear 
invitations to result-oriented jurisprudence :  if the perceived equities 
favor the principal, relieve him of liability for lack of express 
authorization; if they favor the third person dealing with the 
mandatary, uphold the contract as within the mandatary's implied 
authority under article 2995. Surely this is not a generally desirable 
state of affairs. 
Perhaps even more troubling is that, doctrinally, no explanation is 
given as to why this inherent conflict need exist at all. To begin with, 
there is no suggestion as to why the specific transactions included in 
articles 2996 and 2997 are singled out for special treatment, other than 
the mere fact that the pre-Revision code so provided.229 One may 
accept the general precept that certain transactions are, as a class, more 
significant than others, thus justifying specific, "express" 
authorization, but if the law makes those choices, it would be useful to 
225. Id. at 329. 
226. Id. The court appears to use "unauthorized" here in the sense of lacking express 
authorization. 
227. See id. at 330. 
228. Id. (emphasis added). 
229. See LA. CIV. CooE ANN. arts. 2996-2997 cmts. (West Supp. 1999). 
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articulate the policies underlying the line-drawing. Why, for example, 
must a mandatazy always have express authority to borrow money for 
his principal, but not to hire and fire the principal 's employees? 
Nothing in the commentary illuminates in any way the rationale for 
articles 2996 and 2997. 
Even if one were to conclude that the choices made in articles 
2996 and 2997 are appropriate ones, a final question remains: why did 
the drafters believe that no exceptions whatsoever should be made to 
the rule that authority for the enumerated transactions must be 
express? It is simple enough to posit a regime under which authority 
for certain transactions ordinarily must be express, while at the same 
time recognizing exceptions to that rule under appropriate 
circumstances. 
Indeed, this essentially is the common-law approach; the 
Restatement of Agency specifically articulates situations under which 
the authority to buy or sell,230 lease,23 1 receive payment,232 borrow,233 
and make negotiable instruments234 is inferred. In addition, the 
Restatement specifically enumerates the implied authorities of a 
manager of a business. 235 
230. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 1 94, § 52 ("Unless otherwise agreed, authority to 
buy property for the principal or to sell his property is inferred from authority to conduct 
transactions for the principal, if such purchase or sale is incidental to such transactions, 
usually accompanies them, or is reasonably necessary in accomplishing them."). 
23 I . See id. § 67. 
Id. 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, authority to lease land or chattels is inferred from 
a�tho_
rity �o �an.age the subj�ct_ 
matter if leasing is the usual method of dealing 
with 1t or if, m view of the pnnc1pal's business and other circumstances leasing is 
a reasonable method of dealing with it. 
' 
(2) Authori
_
ty to lease land or chattels is not inferred merely from an authority to 
sell the subject matter, to take charge of it, or to receive rents from it. 
232. �ee id. § 7 1 ("Unless oth�rwi�e agreed, authority to receive payment is inferred from a�thonty to conduct a transaction 1f the receipt of payment is incidental to such a transaction, usually accompanies it, or is a reasonably necessary me c 1· h. it."). ans ior accomp 1s mg 
233. See id. . § 7� ("Unles� otherwise agreed, an agent is not authorized to borrow unless such borro�� 1s usually incident to the performance of acts which he is authorized to perform for the principal."). 
endo��
4
�e 
�f id. § 76 ("Unless otherwise a�eed, an agent is not authorized to execute or to 
rfi 
g 
f
ab
th
le paper �ess �uch execution or endorsement is usually incident to the pe orrnance o 
. 
e acts which he 1s authorized to perform for the princi al ") 235. See id. § 73: p · · 
Unless
(
o
)
th
t
erwis
alc
e agreed, authority to manage a business includes authority· a o m e contracts wh· h · ·d 
· 
made in it, or are reasonably nece� � :�d��:�g
t?
t· 
such business, are usually 
(b) to procure equipment and sup lies and 
, 
. 
necessary for the proper conduct of the busfuess· 
to make reparrs reasonably 
' 
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It is true, of course, that a Restatement is, by its nature, 
substantially more detailed than a civil code. Nonetheless, some 
exceptions to articles 2996 and 2997 would be consistent not only with 
the spirit of the common law rules but, more importantly, with that of 
article 2995 itself. Even limited exceptions are far more reflective of 
the business realities of the modem commercial world and the 
reasonable expectations of those acting therein. It is a safe prediction 
that courts will tend to resist vigorous application of articles 2996 and 
2997 to garden-variety transactions of mandataries with general 
authority. Faced with the dilemmas presented by seemingly inflexible 
rules, courts will seek mechanisms to create the flexibility necessary to 
resolve disputes in such a fact-sensitive area. 
Fortunately, ameliorative doctrines do exist. For example, the 
principal who with knowledge of the mandatarts acts receives the 
benefits thereof may be deemed to have tacitly ratified them after the 
fact, notwithstanding the lack of express authority.236 Indeed, 
acquiescence in a series of ostensibly ''unauthorized,, transactions 
could give rise to an estoppel or, at some point, even be considered as 
a species of "express" authority. That observation leads to a final 
point: The ultimate issue under articles 2996 and 2997 is how 
"express,, express authority must be? It seems likely that, in contrast 
to the Radio/one approach of simply choosing to follow one Code 
article rather than another, courts will seek to find an "expression" of 
authority in some words or conduct of the principal which the court 
can interpret in a fashion (reasonably or unreasonably) as permitting 
an equitable result. 
10. Self-Contracting 
Id. 
Art. 2998. Contracting with one� self 
A mandatary who represents the principal as the other contracting 
party may not contract with himself unless he is authorized by the 
( c) to employ, supervise, or discharge employees as the course of business 
may reasonably require; . . . 
( d) to sell or otherwise dispose of goods or other thmgs m accordance with 
the purposes for which the business is operated; 
( e) to receive payment of sums due the principal and to pay debts due from 
the principal arising out of the business enterprise; and 
(f) to direct the ordinary operations of the business. 
236. See LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 1 843 (West 1 987). 
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principal, or, in making such contract, he is merely falfilling a duty to 
h . . 1 231 t epnnczpa . 
a. Self-Contracting Prohibited 
Article 2998 states the self-evident proposition that a mandatary 
may not contract with himsel£ Technically, sue� s�lf-con�a�ting 
would be possible because a mandatary who acts within the lmuts of 
his authority acts not for himself but for his principal. Colloquially 
speaking, he is wearing the principal's hat. The thrust o f  the above 
article is that the mandatary may not, at the same time and in the 
same act, wear his own individual hat.238 As obvious as this 
proposition may sound, it was not stated explicitly in any of the civil 
codes prior provisions on mandate. Thus, as stated in the comments 
under article 2998, "[t]his provision is new."239 
b. Exceptions 
The comments also acknowledge that article 2998 "is based on" 
article 235 of the Greek Civil Code, article 1395 of the Italian Civil 
Code, and section 1 8 1  of the German Civil Code.240 The words 
"based on" suggest both similarities and differences from the source 
provisions. The similarities are that, like article 2998, all three 
source provisions generally prohibit self-contracting as defined 
above and that all three allow the equally self-evident exception for 
cases in which self-contracting is authorized by the principal.241 
Further, under general principles, subsequent ratification by the 
principal should have the same effect as prior authorization.  
The differences are the following: All three source provisions 
include within the scope of the prohibition of self-contracting contracts 
entered into by a person acting as the mandatary of both contracting 
parties.242 In contrast, such contracts do not fall within the scope of 
�cle 2998243 F�e�ore, such contracts seem to be permitted by 
article 3000. Like article 2998, the three source provisions allow an 
237. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2998 (West Supp. 1 999). 
238. For situation� � which the mandatary contracts with himself in his c aci as mandatary for another pnnc1pal, see infra notes 240-249 and accompanying t t 
ap ty 
239. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2998 cmt. 
ex . 
240. See id. 
24 1 .  The Italian Ci�i� Code requires specific authorization. See ITALY c c  art 1 39S The Greek and German c1vd codes speak of acts allowed b th · · I 
· · · · 
GREEK CIV. CODE art. 235. 
y e pnncipa · See § 1 81 BGB; 
242. See supra note 241 .  
243 . See LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 3000. 
1999] A KOMMENTAR ON LOUISIANA 'S NEW LA W 1 1 33 
exception from the principle of prohibiting self-contracting, but this 
exception is phrased differently. The Greek and German civil codes 
allow an exception for a juridical act which "consists exclusively in the 
fulfillment of an obligation,"244 while the Italian Civil Code allows an 
exception for any contract the content of which "is established in such 
a way as to preclude the possibility of a conflict of interests. "245 Thus, 
this part of article 2998 is closer to the Greek and German provisions 
but it may differ from both of them to the extent it speaks of a "duty" 
rather than an "obligation" and it specifies that the duty must be one 
owed ''to the principal."246 A relevant example from the Greek 
jurisprudence is a situation in which a mandatary acting in his 
individual capacity pays himself (in his capacity as the principal's 
mandatary) a debt owed by the mandatary to the principal, or vice 
versa.247 Another example that fits the language of the Louisiana 
article is a situation in which a mandatary authorized to sell perishable 
goods belonging to the principal buys the goods after exhausting all 
efforts to find other suitable buyers. In light of the mandatary's duty 
''to fulfill with prudence and diligence the mandate he has 
accepted,"248 such a sale or purchase should be considered the 
fulfillment of "a duty to the principal,"249 and thus should not fall 
within the prohibition of self-contracting provided in article 2998. 
1 1 .  Capacity 
ArL 2999. Person of limited capacity 
A person of limited capacity may act as a mandatary for matters for 
which he is capable of contracting. In such a case, the rights of the 
principal against the mandatary are subject to the rules governing the 
obligations of persons of limited capacity.250 
This article is based on article 3001  of the Louisiana Civil Code 
as amended in 1 979.251 The source article, however, provided only 
for emancipated minors, which, of course, have full contractual 
capacity.252 In contrast, the new article speaks of "persons of limited 
244. § 1 8 1  BGB. The Greek article requires further that any such self-contract which 
is not clothed with the notarial form is null. See GREEK av. CODE art. 235. 
245. ITALY C.c. art. 1395. For a similar exception, see BW art. 68. 
246. Compare LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2998, with ITALY C.c. art. 1395, and GREEK 
Crv. CODE art. 235, and § 1 8 1  BGB. 
24 7. See Touss1s, supra note 21 ,  at 697. 
248. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3001. 
249. Id. art. 2998. 
250. Id. art. 2999. 
25 1 .  See id. art. 2999 cmt. (a). 
252. See LA. CIV. CooE ANN. art. 1922 (West 1987). 
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capacity," which includes unemancipated minors, as well as persons 
placed under limited interdiction. To the extent these persons are 
capable of contracting for themselves they . 
are also capable. 
of 
serving as mandataries for another. Thus, a mmor who under article 
1 923 is capable of entering into certain "contracts for necessaries"253 
is also capable of entering into the same contracts as mandatary for 
another. Furthermore persons of limited capacity may perform all , 
254 the material acts contemplated by the mandate. 
12. Mandatary of Both Parties 
Art. 3000. Mandatary of both parties 
A person may be the mandatary of two or more parties, such as a 
buyer and a seller, for the purpose of transacting one or more af airs 
involving all of them. In such a case, the mandatary must disclose to 
each party that he also represents the other.255 
Article 30 1 6  of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provided that 
"[t]he broker or intermediary is he who is employed to negotiate a 
matter between two parties, and who, for that reason, is considered as 
the mandatary of both."256 The 1870 Code also contained four other 
articles regulating the duties and responsibilities of brokers.257 These 
articles have not been reproduced by the new Act because in the 
meantime brokerage is regulated by special legislation. 258 
The new Act does, however, sanction the concept of what may be 
colloquially called a "double agent," namely a person who, in one and 
the same act, acts as the mandatary of more than one principal. Article 
3000 allows such a person to act on behalf of both or all the principals 
even in the same transaction and even if their respective interests are 
not parallel, subject only to his obligation to disclose this fact to the 
affected principals.259 Thus, under this article, a person may represent 
both the seller and the buyer and in that capacity negotiate and 
effectuate the sale of a house. Obviously, such a sale is  a species of 
self-contracting, but it is not the same as the "pure" self-contracting 
253 .  See id. at 1923. 
2?4. For th� question of whether a contract that calls for the performance of exclus1vely matenal acts can qualify as a mandate, see supra notes 1 23 - 1 50 and accompanying text. 
255. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3000 (West Supp. 1999). 256. LA. Crv. CODE art. 3016 (1 870) (repealed 1 997). 257. See id. arts. 3017-3020 (repealed 1 997). 
25 8. See �A. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 3000 cmt. (b) (West Supp. 1999). 259. See id. art. 3000 "Under this prov· · d d' · b k b d 
· ision, epen mg on particular arrangements a �� 3��7mt� �� atary of the buyer, of the seller, or of both the buyer and the seller." Id. 
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that is prohibited by article 2998.260 Yet, the possibility of a conflict of 
interests is equally present in both situations. Recognizing this 
problem, article 3017 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 870 required the 
mandatary to "observe the same fidelity towards all parties, and not 
favor one more than another."261 Although this article was not 
reproduced by the new Act, the same duty of fidelity continues to exist 
by virtue of new article 3001 .262 
B. The Internal Relations Between the Principal and the Mandatary 
1 .  In General 
The methodology employed in this subpart diverges from that 
of the previous parts of the Article. Rather than providing an article­
by-article discussion, this subpart provides a brief summary of 
articles 3001 through 3015. In addition to the space limitations of 
this Review, this divergence is justified by the fact that the new 
articles on internal relations do not change in any significant way the 
pre-Revision law, although some matters previously unexpressed are 
now expressed. 263 Moreover, on a practical level, most disputes 
invoking the law of mandate tend to involve the rights and liabilities 
of the principal and third person, rather than principal and mandatary. 
Finally, the rules expressed in articles 3001 through 301 5 are 
ultimately fairly self-evident. They flow essentially from the 
fiduciary nature of  the relationship itself.264 As a function thereof, 
260. See id. art. 2998. 
26 1 .  LA. CIV. CODE art. 3017 (1 870) (repealed 1 997). 
262. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3001 (West Supp. 1999). 
263. Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3001 (West Supp. 1999), with LA. CIV. CoDE 
art. 3002 (1870) (repealed 1997); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. 3002 (West Supp. 1 999), with LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 3003 (1 870) (repealed 1997); LA. C1v. CoDE ANN. art. 3004 (West Supp. 
1999), with LA. CIV. CoDE arts. 3005, 3023 (1870) (repealed 1997); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 
3005 (West Supp. 1 999), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 3015 (1870) (repealed 1997); LA. Clv. 
CODE ANN. rut. 3007 (West Supp. 1999), with LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3007, 3008, 3009 (1 870) 
(repealed 1997); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3008 (West Supp. 1999), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 
3010 (1 870) (repealed 1997); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3009 (West Supp. 1999), with LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 3014 (1870) (repealed 1997); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3010 (West Supp. 
1999), with LA. CIV. CoDE art. 3021 (1870) (repealed 1997); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 301 1 
(West Supp. 1999), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 3011  ( 1 870) (repealed 1997); LA. CIV. CoDE 
ANN. art. 3012 (West Supp. 1 999), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 3022 (1870) (repealed 1997); LA. 
CJv. CODE ANN. art. 3013 (West Supp. 1 999), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 3024 (1 870) (repealed 
1997); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 3019 (West Supp. 1999), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 3025 
(1 870) (repealed 1 997); LA. CIV. CODE ANN . art. 3015 (West Supp. 1999), with LA. Clv. 
CODE ANN. art. 3026 (1 870) (repealed 1997). 
264. The fiduciary nature of the relationship has long been recognized by Louisiana 
courts. See, e.g., Gerdes v. Estate of Cush, 953 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1 992); Cuggy v. 
Zeller, 61 So. 209, 2 1 1 - 12  (La. 1913); cf REsTATEMENT, supra note 194, § 1 (1) (defining 
agency as a fiduciary relation). 
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the mandatary owes his principal a duty to act with due care and 
diligence, a duty of loyalty to avoid conflicts of interest, and a duty to 
account. Correspondingly, the principal has a �u� t? hold �he 
mandatary harmless for actions o f  the mandatary within his authonty. 
Those duties are discussed below. 
2. Duties of the Mandatary to the Principal 
Articles 3001 through 3009 outline the obligations of the 
mandatary to the principal. Article 3001 imposes upon the 
mandatary the duty to fulfill his mandate ''with prudence and 
diligence," and holds him liable to the principal for damages caused 
by his failure to perform, 265 although those damages may be reduced 
by the court if the mandate is gratuitous.266 The duty of loyalty is not 
directly imposed by the mandate articles; it is said to derive from the 
general obligation of good faith.267 
The mandatary likewise has a duty to provide information and to 
account to the principal268 and to turn over to the principal all that he 
receives pursuant to the mandate, except sufficient property to pay his 
expenses.269 He owes interest on the principal's money diverted to his 
own use.270 
While the mandatary ordinarily must fulfill the mandate himself, 
under certain unforeseen circumstances he may delegate his duties to a 
substitute.271 If the act of substitution is authorized, the mandatary is 
responsible for acts of the substitute only if the mandatary was 
265. LA. av. CODE ANN. art. 3001 (West Supp. 1 999) ("The mandatary is bound to 
fulfill with prudence and diligence the mandate he has accepted. He is responsible to the 
principal for the loss that the principle sustains as a result of the mandatary's failure to 
perform."). 
266. See id. art. 3002 ("When the mandate is gratuitous, the court may reduce the 
amount of loss for which the mandatary is liable."). 
267. See id. art. 3001 cmt. (b); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1759 (West 1987). 
. �68. See LA. CIV. <::ooE ANN. art. 3003 (West Supp. 1999) ("At the request of the 
pnnc1pal? or when the ctrcumstances so require, the mandatary is bound to provide 
mformat1on and render an account of his performance of the mandate. The mandatary is 
bound to notify t:he principal, �ithout delay, of !he fulfillment �f the mandate."). 
26_9. See z�. art. 3004 ( 'The �dat� 1s bo.
und to dehver to the principal everything 
he rece1v�d �Y "'.trtue of t�e mandat�, mcludmg thmgs he received unduly. The mandatary 
may retam m hts poss�ss1on sufficient property of the principal to pay the mandatary's 
expenses and remuneration."). 
270. See �d . . art. 3005 (''The mandatary owes interest, from the date used, on sums of money of the pnnc1pal that the mandatary applies to his own use."). 
27 1 .  See id. art. �006 ("ln the absence of contrary agreement, the mandatary is bound 
to fulfill the �andate himself. Nevertheless, if  the interests of the principal so r uire when 
unforeseen �rrc�ces p�ev.ent the mandatary from performing his duties and�e is �nable to communicate wt th the prmctpal, the mandatary may appoint a substitute."). 
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negligent in choosing the substitute or instructing him. 272 If the 
substitution was unauthorized, the mandatary is automatically 
responsible for the substitute's acts.273 In all cases, the principal can 
pursue the substitute. 274 
For reasons discussed in detail later,275 the pre-Revision Code did 
not address the question of the mandatary's responsibility to the 
principal, as opposed to third persons, for acts exceeding the 
mandatory's authority. Article 3008 now imposes liability on the 
mandatary for such acts, although the principal has no such 
responsibility to the mandataty unless the principal ratifies those 
acts.276 Finally, consistent with the general principle that solidarity is 
not presumed,277 multiple mandataries are not solidarily liable to a 
common principal unless otherwise agreed.278 
3. Duties of the Principal to the Mandatary 
Articles 3010 through 301 5 state the obligations owed by the 
principal to the mandatary. Article 3010 now imposes an express 
obligation owed by the principal to the mandatary to perform 
authorized obligations, as well as obligations contracted by the 
mandatary after termination of the mandate without knowledge of 
tennination.279 The principal is liable to the mandatary for 
Id. 
272. See id. art. 3007. 
When the mandatary is authorized to appoint a substitute, he is answerable 
to the principal for the acts of the substitute only if he fails to exercise diligence in 
selecting the substitute or in giving instructions. 
When not authorized to appoint a substitute, the mandatary is answerable to 
the principal for the acts of the substitute as if the mandatary had performed the 
mandate himself. 
In all cases, the principal has recourse against the substitute. 
273. See id. 
274. See id. 
275. See infra notes 339-342 and accompanying text. 
276. See LA. av. CODE ANN. art. 3008 ("If the mandatary exceeds his authority, he is 
answerable to the principal for resulting loss that the principal sustains. The principal is not 
answerable to the mandatary for loss that the mandatary sustains because of acts that exceed 
his authority unless the principal ratifies those acts."). 
277. See id. art. 1796 (West 1987). 
278. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3009 (West Supp. 1999) ("Multiple mandataries are 
not solidarily liable to their common principal, unless the mandate provides otherwise."). 
279. See id. art. 3010. 
The principal is bound to the mandatary to perform the obligations that the 
mandatary contracted within the limits of his authority. The principal is also.bo�d to the rnandatary for obligations contracted by the mandatary after the tenrunation 
of the mandate if at the time of contracting the mandatary did not know that the 
mandate had terminated. 
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unauthorized obligations only if he ratifies them. 280 In this sense, the 
mandatary's acts can be "authorized" if he fulfills his duties in a 
manner more advantageous to the principal than originally 
authorized. 281 
The principal must reimburse the mandatary for expenses and 
pay his agreed compensation, even if the purpose of the mandate was 
not accomplished, so long as the failure was not the mandatary's 
fault. 282 He must compensate the mandatary for losses sustained, 
provided they were not caused b y  the mandatary's fault,283 and pay 
interest on amounts expended personally by the mandatary.284 Finally, 
in contrast to the rule on multiple mandataries,285 multiple principals 
are solidarily liable to their mandatary for affairs common to them.286 
C. External Relations 
1 .  Relations Between the Mandatary and Third Persons 
Id. 
Art. 3016. Disclosed mandate and principal 
A mandatary who contracts in the name of the principal within the 
limits of his authority does not bind himself personally for the 
performance of the contract.287 
The principal is not bo�d to the mandatary to perform the obligations that the manda� �ontra�ted which exceed the limits of the mandatary's authority unless the pnnc1pal ratifies those acts. 
280. See id. 
28 1 .  See id. art. 301 1  ('The mandatary .th. when he fulfills his duties · 
acts wi m the limits of his authority even 
authorized."). 
m a manner more advantageous to the principal than was 
282. See id. art. 3012. 
The principal is bound to reimb th charges he has incurred and to pay h . i::
rse e mandatary f�r the expenses and 
The principal is bound to �
m
b 
e remuneration to which he is entitled. 
without the mandatary's fault the 
reim urs
� 
and pay the mandatary even though 
Id. 
purpose 0 the mandate was not accomplished. 
283. See id. art. 3013 ("The princi al is b the mandatary sustains as a result of the 
::i 
d 
oun
b 
d to compensate the mandatary for loss mandatary."). an ate, ut not for loss caused by the fault of the 
284. See id art 3014 (''Th . . · · e pnnc1pal · sums expended by the mandatary in 
rf1 owes interest from the date of the expenditure on 285. See .supra note 278 and 
pe orrnance of the mandate.") 
286. See LA. CIV CODE .h .. �
companying text. 
. 
them ar rd ·1 
· �N. art. 301 5  ("Multi l · · e so 1 an Y bound to their mandat ") 
P e pnncipals for an affair common to 287. Id. art. 3016. ary. · 
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Art. 301 7. Undisclosed mandate 
A mandatary who contracts in his own name without disclosing his 
status as a mandatary binds himself personally for the peiformance of 
the contract.288 
Art. 3018. Disclosed mandate; undisclosed principal, 
A mandatary who enters into a contract and discloses his status as a 
mandatary, though not his principal, binds himself personally for the 
performance of the contract. The mandatary ceases to be bound when 
the principal is disclosed.289 
a. Disclosed and Undisclosed Agency in Louisiana: A Brief 
History 
The general background in Louisiana of the doctrine of 
''undisclosed agency," i.e., the ability of an agent to create binding 
relations between his principal and third persons without disclosing 
the principars existence or identity, has recently been discussed in 
some detail in this Review,290 and thus only a brief survey will be 
offered in this article. In short, common-law principles of 
undisclosed agency were imported into Louisiana beginning with the 
1 828 supreme court opinion in Williams v. Wznchester,291 and for well 
over a century to follow the process was unabated.292 The first bump 
in the road challenging the efficacy o f  that process came in the 1947 
supreme court case, Sentell v. Richardson.293 In Sentell, the 
defendant agreed to purchase stock for the plaintiff from a third 
person, without disclosing his purpose, and to transfer the stock to 
the plaintiff upon acquisition.294 Although the defendant was 
288. Id. art. 3017. 
289. Id. art. 3018. 
290. See Michael B. North, Comment, Qui Facit Per Aliurn, Facit Per Se: 
Representation, Mandate, and Principles of Agency in Louisiana at the Turn of the Twenty­
First Century, 72 TuL. L. REv. 279, 295-99 (1997). For other extended treatments of the 
issue, see Glenn G. Morris, Personal Liability for Corporate Participants Without Corporate 
Veil-Piercing: Louisiana Law, 54 LA. L. REv. 207, 2 13-25 ( 1993) [hereinafter Morris, 
Personal Liability]; Fred W. Jones, Comment, Juridical Basis of Principal-Third Party 
liability in Louisiana Undisclosed Agency Cases, 8 LA. L. REV. 409 �1948); Thomas P. 
LeBlanc, Note, Woodlawn Park Limited Partnership v. Doster Construction Company, Inc: 
Disclosing Undisclosed Agency Law in Louisiana, 54 LA. L. REV. 1395 (1994). 
291 .  7 Mart. (n.s.) 22 (La. 1828). 
292. For a collection of early cases, see Jones, supra note 290, at 412- 14. 
293. 29 So. 2d 852 (La. 1947). 
294. See id. at 853-54. 
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successful in purchasing the stock, he refused to deliver it to the 
plaintiff, prompting suit.295 
The defendant's principal response was that he was not a 
mandatary at all, basing this on former article 2985 which defined 
mandate as "an act by which one person gives power to another to 
transact for him and in his name, one or several affairs. "296 The 
defendant argued that, because he did not act in the plaintiff's name, he 
could not be his mandatary.297 Rejecting that theory, the c ourt stated: 
Our opinion is that the words "and in his name" are not essential to the 
definition of a procuration or power of attorney, as defined in article 
2985 of the Civil Code. If those words were essential to the definition 
there could be no such thing as a procuration or power o f  attorney to 
buy property for an undisclosed principal. 298 
Whatever one may think o f  the propriety o f  the court's 
conclusion, 299 Sentell appeared to be a ringing reaffirmation of 
undisclosed agency theory as a basic principle of Louisiana agency 
law. In 1 983, however, the Louisiana First Circuit Court o f  Appeal 
challenged that proposition in Teachers ' Retirement System v. 
Louisiana State Employees Retirement System.300 Noting the lack of 
any reference to undisclosed agency in the Civil Code and without 
even citing Sentell, the Teachers ' court utilized a civilian analysis to 
deny an undisclosed principal the right to sue a third person.301 The 
impact of Teachers ' was, however, uncertain at best. One reason is 
that the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the case on procedural 
grounds, and the undisclosed agency issue was not reconsidered.302 
Within a year after Teachers ', however, the First Circuit upheld an 
action by a third person against an undisclosed principal. 303 Thus, 
295. See id: .The defendant actu.ally sold the shares to yet another person, but that aspect of the case is irrelevant to the undisclosed agency issue. See id. at 854. 
296. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2985 ( 1 870) (repealed 1997) (emphasis added). 
297. See Sentell, 29 So. 2d at 855. 
298. Id. Note how the court used the terms "procuration" and "power of attorney" as synonyms �or mandate, a usage foreclosed by the Revision. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text. 
299. For commentary, see Robert A. Pascal, Agency, 8 LA. L. REv. 223 225-26 (1948); Jana L. Grauberger, Comment, From Mere Intrusion to General Confusio .
' 
A and M�ndate in Louisiana, 72 TUI.. L. REv. 257, 266-68 ( 1997); Jones, supra n�te 2���� 414-15, North, supra note 290, at 296; LeBlanc, supra note 290, at 1 405-06. 
1 984:.
oo. 444 So. 2d 1 93 (La Ct. App. 1 983), rev 'd on other grounds, 456 So. 2d 594 (La 
3 0 1 .  See id. at 1 96-97. 
302. See Teachers' Retirement Sys. v L · · s · 456 So. 2d 594 (La 1 984). 
· ouisiana tate Employees Retirement Sys., 
303. See Frank's Door & Bldg Su I In D (La Ct. App. 1 984). 
. PP y, c. v. ouble H Constr. Co., 4 5 9  So. 2d 1273 
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one might have reasonably concluded that Teachers ' was an 
aberration, a one-time blip on a radar screen. 
However, one who did so would have been wrong, because in 
1992, Teachers ' rose, phoenix-like, from its ashes, as the First Circuit 
again relied upon it to deny an undisclosed principal the right to sue a 
third person.304 This time, though, the supreme court granted writs, 
and the resulting opinion, Woodlawn Park Limited Partnership v. 
Doster Constroction Co. ,  unequivocally reaffirmed that undisclosed 
agency was part of the fabric of Louisiana's law of mandate, based not 
upon the Civil Code but rather as an importation from the common 
law.305 Indeed, on that point the court could hardly have been more 
blunt; Justice Lemmon stated: 
The Civil Code has never fully developed the concept of agency and 
representation with respect to the direct acquisition of rights and 
liabilities through the contractual action of a properly authorized 
intennediary who may or may not disclose his representative capacity. 
However, Louisiana courts, perhaps recognizing that agency as a field 
of commercial law should be uniform throughout the country, have 
adopted notions of common law agency. 
We restate approval of the use of common law agency notions in 
commercial transactions. In matters of commercial law, Louisiana has 
frequently taken steps to make our law uniform with other states.306 
While the breadth of Justice Lemmon's declaration has been 
criticized,307 the Revision affirms Woodlawn Park by explicitly 
providing for undisclosed agency as part of Louisiana's positive 
law.308 However, if Justice Lemmon's true desire was complete 
uniformity between Louisiana mandate law and common law, this 
purpose has not been fully achieved. For, as discussed below, some 
differences continue to exist. 
b. Disclosed and Undisclosed Principals in the Revision 
Article 3016 now specifically relieves the mandatary from any 
liability to the person with whom he deals so long as the mandatary 
(1) identifies his principal and (2) does not exceed his authority.309 In 
essence this is what the common law refers to as an agent for a ' 
304. See Woodlawn Park Ltd. Partnership v. Doster Constr. Co., 602 So. 2d 1 029 (La. 
Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 623 So. 2d 645 (La. 1993). 
· 
305. 623 So. 2d 645, 647-48 (La 1993). 
306. Id. at 647-48 (citations omitted). 
307. See, e.g. , North, supra note 290, at 296-99. 
308. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3017-3018. 
309. See id. art. 3016  cmt. (b). 
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"disclosed" (sometimes fully disclosed) principal: the thi�d pe�son at 
the time of the transaction has notice both that the agent is actmg for 
a principal and the principal's identity.31° Consistent with the 
common law, such a mandatary does not become a party to the 
contract, subject, of course, to any contrary agreement with those 
with whom he deals. 3 1 1  
Conversely, under article 301 7, a mandatary, who discloses 
neither the principal's identity nor that he is acting for a principal, is a 
party to the contract-what the common law calls an agent for an 
''undisclosed" principal.312 Article 3017  is likewise consistent with the 
common law313  as well as the pre-Revision jurisprudence.314 
In each of the above cases, the result flows from simple objective 
contract theory. When the principal is disclosed, the person dealing 
with the mandatary could reasonably understand that he is contracting 
only with the principal, and that would be his intent, absent some clear 
expression by the mandatary that he likewise promises performance of 
the obligation.315 On the other hand, when the principal is completely 
undisclosed, because there has been no manifestation of assent by the 
principal, the third person would obviously expect the liability of the 
mandatary, the only person of whose existence he is aware.3 16 
c. Partially Disclosed Principals Under the Revision 
Article 301 8 deals with what the common law refers to as an 
agent for a partially disclosed principal:3 17  the mandatary discloses 
that he is representing someone, but not who the "someone" is.318 
Article
. 
301 8  :idopts a rule somewhat more complex than the two 
precedmg articles: such a mandatary is initially bound for the 
?erfo:rn�ce of the c�n�act, 
3 1
�ut is released from liability upon 
1dent1fication of the pnnc1pal. This is a rather peculiar rule, one 
3 10. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1 94 § 4 ( I)  
3 1 1 . See id. § 320. 
' 
· 
3 12. See id. § 4 (3). 
3 13 .  See id. § 322. 
3 14. See, e.g., Chappuis & Chappuis v Ka Ian 129 
Traina Plumbing & Heating Contractors In 
· 
f 
1 ' So. 156, 1 57-58 (La. 1930); C.T. 
1991); Dash Bldg. Materials Ctr., Inc. v. 'He�� 
��e� 580 So. 2d 525, 528 (La Ct. App. 
Frank's Door & Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Double H
g, o. 2d 653, 656 (La Ct. App. 1990); 
Ct. App. 1984). See genera/ly Morris Perso i°L'0��1!· 
Co., 459 So. 2d 1 273,  l 275-77 (La. 
3 15. See RESTATEMENT supra �ote I 9
�a za I tty, supra note 290, at 2 1 3- 1 7. 
cmt. (c) (West Supp. 1 999). 
' ' § 320 cmt. (a); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 3016 
3 1 6. See RESTATEMENT supra not 1 94 § 
3 1 7. See id. § 4 (2). 
' e ' l S6 cmts. ( a)-(b ); id. § 322. 
3 1 8. See LA. Crv CODE ANN 3 0  
3 1 9. See id. 
· 
· art. l 8 (West Supp. 1 999). 
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which differs both from the common law and the pre-Revision 
jurisprudence, and may represent one of the least successful choices 
made in the Revision. 
As to the common law, the general rule is that an agent for a 
partially disclosed principal becomes a party to contracts he makes, 
absent some contrary agreement by the person with whom he deals.320 
The rationale underlying the rule is, once again, one of objective 
contract theory. Here, in contrast to complete nondisclosure cases, the 
third person is aware that there is someone "lurking in the 
background" who at some point will preswnably emerge. But few 
people would put their complete trust in the creditworthiness of an 
unidentified person. Thus, the most plausible ordinary interpretation 
would be that the third person would nnderstand that the agent, whose 
identity he does know and whose creditworthiness is subject to 
evaluation, is at least a co-obligor on the contract.321 On the other 
hand, under the common-law approach, there is clearly no mechanism 
for automatic absolution of the agent by the simple act of disclosure. 
Rather, the agent remains a co-obligor or surety for the principal even 
after the principal steps forward, absent, of course, some specific 
agreement by the parties for the agent's release. 322 But the 
Restatement clearly treats this as the exception to the generally 
assumed intentions of the parties. 
Before the Revision, Louisiana jurisprudence failed to distinguish 
between undisclosed and partially-disclosed agency. Generally, the 
courts imposed personal liability on the agent for inadequately 
disclosing his principal,323 whether the agent failed completely to 
disclose that he was acting as an agent,324 or simply failed, in some 
way, to adequately identify his principal.325 At the same time, while 
Id. 
320. See REsrATEMENT, supra note 1 94, § 321 .  
321.  See id. § 321  cmt. (a). In the words of the Restatement: 
The inference of an understanding that the agent is a party to the contract exists 
unless the agent gives such complete information concerning his principal's 
identity that he can be readily distinguished. If the other party has no reason�le 
means of ascertaining the principal, the inference is almost irresistible and prevails 
in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. 
322. See id. § 3 2 1  cmt. (b); id. § 336 cmt. (d). . 
323. For a collection of cases and discussion of pre-Revision law, see Moms, 
Personal Liability, supra note 290, at 219-25. 
324. See, e.g. , Black Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. Koehl & Assocs., Inc., 571  So. 2d 902, 
904-905 (La. Ct. App. I 990); Travis v. Hudnall, 5 1 7  So. 2d 1085, 1 089-90 (La. Ct. App. 
1987). 
325. See, e.g. , Wilkinson v. Sweeney, 532 So. 2d 243, 246-48 (La Ct. App. 1988)� 
You'll See Seafoods, Inc. v. Gravois, 520 So. 2d 461 ,  462-63 (La. Ct. App. 1 988); Centanni 
v. A. K. Roy, Inc., 258 So. 2d 2 19, 221-22 (La. a. App. 1972). 
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not distinguishing the concepts, the courts rea�hed �esults that were 
consistent with the ordinary common-law rules JUSt discussed: Agents 
for either undisclosed or partially disclosed principals were generally 
held personally liable, absent contrary agreem�t.326 
• By distinguishing the concepts of undisclosed. from partially­disclosed agency, the Revision brings about a cosm�tic change to the 
jurisprudence. More importantly, howe�er, b� allo�g .th� manda�ary to terminate his liability merely by disclosmg his pnnc1pal, article 
3018 not only brings about a substantive change from the 
jurisprudential regime but also deviates from the practice of common 
law states by adopting a rule unique to Louisiana. Of course 
uniqueness is not necessarily a vice; in this case, however, it may be of 
dubious merit. 
It may well be that both the change and the deviation are 
unintended. Because the comments to article 301 8 do not 
acknowledge that the article changes the jurisprudence,327 it is difficult 
to hypothesize about the intent of the article. It may be that the 
drafters believed that when a mandatary acts for a partially disclosed 
principal, the ordinary intention of the parties would be that virtually 
all risks of the transaction should be borne by the third person, rather 
than by the mandatary. However, as explained above, such a belief is 
inconsistent with the assumptions adopted by the common law of our 
sister states. 328 Thus, if the drafters' intent was to bring Louisiana law 
closer to the common law on this issue, this intent has not been carried 
out. 
More importantly, though, by creating an essentially risk-free 
scenario for the mandatary, article 3018 may be an invitation to 
opportunistic behavior. Suppose, for example, that Mandatary fonns 
two corporations: ABC Corporation, which is solidly financed, and 
XYZ Corporation, which is nominally financed. Mandatary then 
con�acts with �� Pers�n, dis�losing that he is acting as a mandatary 
for a corporation. The mcentives thereby created are obvious: if the 
deal pans. out, identify AB� Corporation as the "principal;" if it does not, identify XYZ Corporation and leave Third Person as the holder of the proverbial bag. It is just this sort of opportunism that the common law rule avoids. 
<?f course, our co� may find ways of policing truly outrageous behaVIor. For example, m the above hypothetical, the Mandatary may 
326. See cases cited supra notes 324-325 .  
327. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. �· 3018 cmts. (West Supp. 1999). 328. See supra text accompanymg notes 320-322. 
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still face liability under a corporate veil-piercing theory as a 
shareholder, as opposed to a mere mandataty, assuming that 
appropriate facts are established to justify such a result.329 
Nonetheless, this aspect of article 3 0 1 8  seems an apt topic for 
reconsideration. 
Art. 3019. Liability when authority is exceeded 
A mandatary who exceeds his authority is personally bound to the 
third person with whom he contracts, unless that person knew at the 
time the contract was made that the mandatary had exceeded his 
authority or unless the principal ratifies the contract.330 
d. Consequences of"Exceeding" One's Authority: A 
Historical Background 
The rule announced in article 3019 is one of deceptive 
simplicity: as a counterpart to article 3008, which makes the 
mandataty "answerable" to his principal for losses sustained as a 
result of acts exceeding the mandatary's authority,331 article 3019 
"personally binds" him to the third person for such acts, absent 
knowledge that the mandatary exceeded his authority or ratification 
by the principal. 332 In fact, though, there is much more to this issue 
than meets the eye, requiring some background discussion of the 
common law, the old Code, and the jurisprudence. 
At common law, the situation is relatively simple. An agent has a 
duty to his principal not to act "except in accordance with the 
principal's manifestation of consent."333 Likewise, absent an effective 
disclaimer, an agent makes an implied warranty of his authority to 
persons with whom he deals. 334 Accordingly, an agent who acts in 
excess of his authority may be liable for damages suffered either by 
the principal335 or the third person336 as a result of his actions.337 In 
329. See generally Glenn G. Morris, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Louisiana, 52 LA. 
L. REv. 271 (1991)  [hereinafter Morris, Piercing the �ii]. 
330. LA. CIV. CODE.ANN. art. 3019. 
33 1 .  See id. art. 3008. For discussion, see supra text accompanying note 276. 
332. See id. art. 3019. 
333. REsrATEMENT, supra note 194, § 383. 
. 
334. See id. § 329. The implied warranty does not arise if a third person knows that 
the agent lacks authority. See id. 
335. See id. §§ 383, 399-401 .  
336. See id. § 329. , . . . . . . 
337. It has been observed that the nature of the agent s hab1hty ts alternative; he ts 
liable either to the principal or third person, but not �oth. The ra?o�ale is that,. on the one 
hand, the agent may have exceeded his actual authonty, but the pnnc1pal may sttll be _
bo�d 
because of the agent's apparent authority or inherent agency power. In that case, the pnnc1pal 
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addition, an agent who tortiously misrepresents his authority
. 
can be 
held liable in tort for detrimental reliance on the misrepresentation.338 
The Louisiana Civil Code never directly addressed the liability of 
a mandatary to his principal for acts exceeding his authority, for the 
very simple reason that former articles 3010 and 302 1  stated that such 
acts could never bind the principal at all. 339 Thus, because the code 
effectively negated such common-law concepts as apparent 
authority,340 there was no need in theory for a positive rule making the 
mandatary accountable to his principal for such acts. But the reality 
was, of course, quite different, because as discussed below, Louisiana 
courts imported common-law apparent authority into our 
jurisprudence,341 and correspondingly courts furnished a rule of 
liability essentially the same as at common law.342 This aspect of the 
mandatary's liability is now covered by article 3008. 343 
With regard to the mandatary's liability to third persons, though, 
the Code always had express rules, and those should be considered in 
comparison to article 301 9. The three operative provisions were 
former articles 3010, 3012, and 301 3 .  Article 3010 provided: ''The 
attorney can not go beyond the limits of his procuration; whatever he 
does exceeding his power is null and void with regard to the principal, 
unless ratified by the latter, and the attorney alone is bound by it in his 
individual capacity."344 Article 3 0 1 2  provided: 'The mandatary, who 
has communicated his authority to a person with whom he contracts in 
becomes a party to the contract, and thus the third person has no loss. The principal 
however, has an action against the agent for breach of duty. 
' 
?n the other hand, if the agent had no power to bind the principal on any theory, then 
the thrrd person has suffer� �e loss �f at least his expectation and can recover damages from 
the agent, although the pnnc1pal obvtously suffers no loss. See Morris, Personal Liability, 
supra note 290, at 23 1 n.92. The sparse case law in Louisiana appears to follow this 
approach. �ee Ite� Co. v. �a �lac� C?-arnber of Commerce, 1 6  So. 2d 567, 572 (La Ct. App. !944) (stating that 1fthe pnnc1pal ts liable, the unauthorized agent cannot be liable unless he 
1s a personal guarantor). 
338. See REsrATEMENT, supra note 1 94, § 3 30. 
339. See LA. CIV. CoDE art. 301 0  ( 1 870) (repealed 1 997) ("Th tt be d h r · · . e a omey can not go 
.
yon t e muts of
_
h1� procuration; �hatever he does exceeding his power is null and void �� r�g�. to the pnn�1p!!1, unless ratified by the latter, and the attome is alone bound b it m his md1V1dual capacity. ); id. art. 3021 (repealed 1 997) (''The · · YI · bo d y th pnnc1pa 1s un to execute ��gag=nts
h
co�tract� by the attorney, conformably to the power confided to him For an mg er e 1s not und, except in so far as he has expressly ratified it ") 340. See John D. Wogan Comment A n · · · l l O, 123-24 ( 1 965). ' ' gency rower In Louisiana, 40 TuL. L. REV. 
341 .  See infra �otes 375-381 and accompanying text. 
cases�.
42. See Moms, Personal Liability, supra note 290, at 232_33, 2 3 7  nn. 1 1 7_2 1 (citing 
343. See LA. av. CODE ANN. art. 3008 (West Supp 1 999 344. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 301 0  ( 1 870) (repealed 199� .. 
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that capacity, is not answerable to the latter for anything done beyond 
i� unl� he has entered into a personal guarantee."345 Article 3013 
provided: 'The mandatary is responsible to those with whom he 
contracts, only when he has bound himself personally, or when he has 
exceed  his authority without having exhibited his powers."346 
At least two ambiguities existed with regard to the above articles. 
The first, and perhaps more important, was the conceptual basis for the 
mandatary's liability to third persons. Article 3010 stated that he was 
''bound" in his individual capacity. While this could be read literally 
as making the mandatary a party to the contract he made as a substitute 
for the principal, that would be an unfortunate interpretation of the law. 
As previously noted,347 the common law premises liability on an 
implied warranty theory, and clearly rejects the idea that the agent 
becomes a party to the contract.348 This is a sensible rule firmly 
grounded in objective contract theory, for if the agent became a party 
to the contract, then he would obtain the right to enforce it against the 
third person or, indeed, to assign his rights in the contract to others, 
subject to normal contract principles limiting assignability. Such a 
result would, however, clearly be inconsistent with the intentions of 
the third person, who understood himself to be contracting only with 
the principal through the actions of the agent. 
Thus, properly understood, the former article 301 0  should have 
"bound" the mandatary only in the sense of making him answerable in 
damages suffered by the third person for breach of what is effectively 
a warranty of authority, a view which Planiol endorsed.349 
Unfortunately, while some of the pre-Revision opinions apply terms 
consistent with the idea that a mandatary who exceeds his authority 
may have become a party to the contract,350 no Louisiana case has 
considered authoritatively the true theoretical basis for the mandatary's 
liability.351 
345. Id. art. 3012 (repealed 1997). 
346. Id. art. 301 3  (repealed 1997). 
347. See supra text accompanying note 336. . 
348. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 1 94, § 329. cmt. . 
The one except.ton at
 common 
law arises from an unauthorized signature on a negotiable mstrument. See id: ; U.C:C. § �-
403(a) (providing unauthorized signature effective as signanu:e of unauthonzed signer. m 
favor of person who in good faith pays the instrument or takes 1t for value). That exception 
applies in Louisiana as well. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § l0:3-403(a) (West 1 993). 
349 See 2 PLANIOL & R.IPERT supra note 32, §§ 1 020, 2256. . 
350
. 
s Vordenbaumen' v. Gray, 1 89 So. 342, 348 (La Ct. App. 1 939) (statmg a 
man� w�� =��;eds his authority "is personally bound to fulfill the terms
 of the contract 
made"). R · · · · prudence see Morris, 35 1 .  For a thorough discussion of the pre- ev1s1on Juns 
, 
Personal Liability, supra note 290, at 237-44. 
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A second question involved the effect of the words 
"communicated his authority" and "exhibited his powers" in fonner 
articles 3012 and 3013, respectively. As one commentator has 
observed, the thrust of those provisions created exceptions to the 
general rule of liability in article 30 10: In effect, if the mandatary has 
"communicated his authority" or "exhibited his powers," then the third 
person is responsible for interpreting that communication; if he 
construes the grant of authority from the principal too broadly, then he, 
not the mandatary, bears the risk. 352 The end result is much the same 
as at common law: the agent who is silent impliedly warrants his 
authority and is liable without regard to fault if he exceeds it. Yet 
liability is avoided if the agent makes it clear that he makes no such 
warranty or if the third person knows he is unauthorized. 353 
Narrowly read, however, articles 301 2  and 30 1 3  could have 
suggested that any exculpatory communication had to come from the 
mandatary himself; the articles were silent as to information acquired 
by the third person from other sources. 354 Logically, there is no reason 
to distinguish between information derived from the mandatary and 
infonnation derived from other sources. In either case, the ultimate 
question is one of objective contract theory: under all the 
circumstances, should the third person have understood that the 
mandatary was making his ordinary warranty of authority, or should 
he have understood that sufficient questions existed as to the 
mandatary's authority that the third person was essentially proceeding 
at his own risk?355 Unfortunately, the existing cases never really 
addressed this issue per se. One commentator surveying the 
jurisprudence concluded that, ultimately, the results in the reported 
cases support the view that, consistent with the common law the ' 
source of information with regard to the mandatary's lack of authority 
was irrelevant.356 
e. Article 3019 Compared 
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, several observations 
can be made about the new article 301 9.  First, the new article states 
that t�e mandatary
. 
exceeding his authority is "personally bound to the third person with whom he contracts "357 This Ian 
· ·r 
· guage is, i 
352. 
353. 
354. 
355. 
356. 
357. 
See id. at 234. 
See REsTATEMENT, supra note 1 94, §§ 329, 3 3 1 .  See LA. �IV. CODE arts. 3012, 3 0 1 3  ( 1 870) (repealed 1997) See �oms, Personal Lia�ility, supra note 290, at 235-36. . See id. at 236-42 (observing that this was Planiol's view). LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3019 (West Supp. 1 999). 
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anything, even more susceptible than its predecessor to the 
interpretation that the mandatary actually becomes a party to the 
contract. Unfortunately, the comments under the article do not shed 
light on the conceptual basis for liability.358 For reasons previously 
expressed, it is submitted that courts should reject this interpretation 
and should conceptualize liability under article 30 19 in warranty 
tenns. 
Article 301 9, however, seems clearly to embrace the view that 
the sow-ce of information involving a mandatary's lack of authority is 
irrelevant; liability is avoided if the third person "knew" that the acts 
exceeded the mandatary's authority, without reference to how he 
knows those facts.359 In that sense, the failure to mention 
communication by the mandatary is a salutary change. 
In another sense, however, the elimination of the "communicated 
his authority" and "exhibited his powers" language in former articles 
3012 and 3013 may have an undesirable effect. As previously 
discussed, the basic thrust of those provisions seemed to be that if the 
mandatary "communicated" or "exhibited" appropriate information 
regarding his authority to the third person, and the latter either 
misinterpreted or even ignored it, then he did so at his own risk. By 
eliminating that language and adopting the rule that the mandatary 
avoids liability only if the third person "knew" that the mandatary 
exceed  his authority, article 3019 may substantially narrow the 
circumstances under which liability would be avoided. 
The key question, of course, is the interpretation of the word 
"knew." The Civil Code offers no definition of the word, but in the 
Louisiana commercial laws, to "know" or "have knowledge" is 
narrowly defined as "actual knowledge" of a fact. 360 By contrast, one 
has ''notice" of a fact when one "has actual knowledge" of it, "has 
received a notice or notification of it," or "from all the facts and 
circumstances known to hitn at the time in question he has reason to 
know that it exists."361 If article 301 9 was meant to adopt an actual 
knowledge test, then the drafters chose an inappropriate stan�d. The 
courts should interpret the word "knew" broadly so as to achieve the 
doctrinally proper result. In other words, the mandatary should not be 
liable if the third person either knew, or from all the facts �d 
circumstances had reason to know, that the mandatary exceeded his 
358. See id. art. 3019  cmt. Indeed, the comment odd�y. does not identi:y former article 
3010 as a source provision, only article 3013  and Quebec CIVIi Code art. 2 1 5  · 
359. See LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 3019. 
360. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1 0: 1 -201 (25) (West Supp. 1999). 
36 1 .  Id. 
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authority. If, on the other hand, courts construe �cle 3019 as 
applicable only in cases of actual knowledge, then the article should be 
amended to adopt a broader, more objective rule. . . . Finally, article 3019 is consistent with pre-Revis10n law m 
restating in its final proviso, the self-evident proposition that the 
mandatary is also relieved of liability if the principal ratifies the 
contract. 362 
2. Relations Between the Principal and Third Persons 
Art. 3020. Obligations of the principal to third persons 
The principal is bound to peiform the contract that the mandatary, 
acting within the limits of his authority, makes with a third person.363 
Article 3020 restates a self-evident rule: a principal is liable for 
the authorized acts of his mandatary. "Authority" in article 3020 is 
used in the same sense as in the Restatement:364 The mandatary's 
actual authority, either express or implied.365 Like article 3021, the 
black-letter rules of the Restatement refer to "authority" without any 
qualifying adj ectives, but in court opinions, including the Louisiana 
jurisprudence, the usage "actual authority, either express or implied" 
is common. 366 
Of course the central factual determination in applying the 
principle of article 3020 is the scope of the mandatary's actual 
authority. The process by which that determination is made can be 
described easily: it is simply a matter of contract interpretation. The 
Louisiana jurisprudence has recognized a rule essentially the same as 
the common-law rule,367 that subject to requirements of form,368 
authority is created ''by written or spoken words or other conduct of 
362. See LA. CIV. CooE ANN. art. 3019. In that regard it is important to remember that 
ratification can take place either by the principal 's expression or tacitly by his knowing 
acceptance of the benefits of the contract. See LA. av. CODE ANN. art. 1 843 (West 1987). 
363. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3020 (West Supp. 1 999). 
364. See REsr'.'TEMENr, sup�a �ote 1 94, § 7 ("Authority is the power of the agent to 
affect the legal relations of the pnnc1pal by acts done in accordance with the principal's 
manifestations of consent to him."). 
365. Id. § 7 cmt. (c); see also REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 1 80, § 14; SEAVY, supra note 194, § 8 .  
366. E.g., Boulos v. Morrison, 503 So. 2 d  1 ,  3 (La. 1987); Broadway v. All-Star Ins. Corp., 285 So'. 2d 536, 538 (La 19�3); State v. Perea, 628 So. 2d 149, 1 5 1  (La. a. App. 1993); AAA Tire & Export, Inc. v. Big Chief Truck Lines Inc. 385 So. 2d 426 429 (La Ct App. 1980). ' ' ' . 
367 . . See, e.g., Tedesco v. Gentry Dev., Inc., 540 So. 2d 960, 963-64 (La 1 989)· Boulos, 503 So. 2d at 7; Broadway, 285 So. 2d at 538· Interstate Elec Co Frank Ad 
' 
Elec. Co., 136 So. 283, 285 (La 193 1 )· AAA Tire 3g5 So 2d at 429 
.
. s · 
v. 
l 
ams
t t . . • • . , ee a so supra ex accompanying note 220 (quoting AAA Tire). 
368. See supra text accompanying notes 1 77-207. 
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the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the agent to believe 
that the principal desires him so to act on the principal's account."369 
As the AAA Tire case previously quoted so well stated, the existence of 
authority therefore turns on the question of whether the agent 
reasonably believed that his acts were authorized. 370 The perspective 
of those with whom he deals is not relevant to that inquiry.371 
It is likewise now clear under article 3020, as at common law,372 
that the rule applies regardless of whether the principal is disclosed, 
partially disclosed, or undisclosed. So long as the mandatary acts 
within his authority, the principal is bound regardless of the degree of 
disclosure by the mandatary.373 
Art. 3021. Putative mandaJary 
One who causes a third person to believe that another person is his 
mandatary is bound to the third person who in good faith contracts 
with the putative mandatary.314 
a. Putative Mandate and Apparent Authority: Old Wme in a 
New Bottle 
The recognition of the apparent authority doctrine in Louisiana 
has been discussed recently in this Review.375 Suffice it to recall that 
two articles of the pre-Revision Code categorically proclaimed that a 
principal would never be bound by acts of a mandatary exceeding his 
authority.376 Literally speaking, therefore, not only was there no 
codal foundation for an "apparent" agency theory, but there was 
indeed a very specific negation of the doctrine. The response of 
Louisiana courts to those articles of the old Code was, however, 
simple: they ignored them entirely. In an apparent concession to the 
necessity to protect the stability of transactions and the reasonable 
369. REsrATEMENT, supra note 194, § 26. 
370. See AAA nre, 3 85 So. 2d at 429. 
37 1 .  See id. 
372. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 194, §§ 144, 1 86; REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra 
note 180, § 95; SEAVY, supra note 194, § 56. 
373. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3020 cmt. (b) (West Supp. 1 999). 
374. Id. art. 302 1 .  
375. See North, supra note 290, at 299-305. . 
, 
376. Specifically, former article 3010 provided. th.at acts exceed1?g
 the mandatary .� 
authority were "null and void with regard to the pnnc1pal, unless ratified by the latter, 
binding the mandatary alone. LA. Ctv. CooE art. 30 1 0  (1 870) (repealed 1997): Articl�.3021 
stated that for any act that did not conform to the mandatary's power, the pnnc1pal ts not 
bound, except in so far as he has expressly ratified it." Id. art. 3021 (repealed 1997). 
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expectations of third persons, the jurisprudence instead imported the 
common-law theory of apparent authority wholesale.377 
Apparent authority is defined by the Restatement as ''the power 
to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions with third 
persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in 
accordance with the other's manifestations to such third persons."378 
As opposed to authority in its strict sense, which depends upon the 
reasonable interpretations by the agent of the conduct of the principal, 
apparent authority is created ''by written or spoken words or any other 
conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third 
person to believe that the principal consents to have the act done on his 
behalf by the person purporting to act for him."379 It may apply when 
the agent exceeds his authority or was not really an agent at all. An 
excellent description of the concept was given by the court in the AAA 
Tzre opinion: 
The concept of apparent authority only comes into play when the 
agent has acted beyond his actual authority and has no permission 
whatsoever from his principal to act in such a manner. The principal 
will be bound for such actions if he has put his agent in such a position 
or has acted in such a manner as to give an innocent third person the 
reasonable belief that the agent has authority to act for the principal. 
The facts and circumstances of each case must be examined to 
determine the reasonableness of the third party's belief. One must look 
from the viewpoint of the third person to detennine whether an 
apparent agency has been created. In transactions between 
377. See, e.g., Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Able Moving & Storage Co., 650 So. 2d 
750, 752-53 (La 1 995); Tedesco v. Gentry Dev., Inc., 540 So. 2d 960, 963-64 (La 1989)· 
Boulos v. Morrison, 503 So. 2d I ,  3 (La. 1987); Broadway v. All-Star Ins. Corp., 285 So. 2d 
536, 538 (La. 1 973); Herbert v. Langhoff, 1 68 So. 508, 5 1 0-1 1  (La 1 936); Interstate Elec. 
Co. �- Frank Adams Elec. Co., 136 So. 283, 285 (La 1 93 1 ); Genina Marine Servs., Inc. v. 
Mobil Exploration & Prod. Southeast, Inc. 506 So. 2d 922, 927-29 (La. Ct. App. 1 987)· AAA 
Tire & Export, In�. v. Big Chief Truck Lines, Inc., 3 85 So. 2d 426, 429 (La. Ct. App. 
'
1 980); 
Agnew v. Mu�leni:c-, 1 1  So. 2d 106, 107-1 08 (La Ct. App. 1942). See generally Wendell H. 
Ho
_
lm�s, �umma�1ons on In���dent Fire Insurance Co. v. Able Moving and Storage Co.: 
Prmc1pa/ s Vicarious Tort Lzab1/1ty for Negligent A cts of an Agents Servant, 56 LA. L. REv. 
571 (1996); North, supra note 290, at 299-305 ; Wogan, supra note 340, at 1 1 2-30. 
378. REsTATEMENT, supra note 194, § 8. 
379. Id. § 27. According to the comments to the Restatement the m· fio ..; 1·ed b th th" d . 
, rma ..on re 1 
upon y e IT person can come �rre
_
c�ly from the principal, from authorized statements of the agent, from documents or other md1c1a of authority mven to the age t b th · · al fr th hi d . . o• n y e pnnc1p , or even . om o er t . T persons who received mformation as to the agent's authority from auth�nzed or �rnutted channels. Indeed, apparent authority can be created b the rinci al's acqu�escence m acts of the agent that �stablish a community reputation for h
y 
· 
p 
th 
p 
· and m some cases by the mere appointment of the agent t .ti. h 
avm� au �n�, 
rtain "d I ized d · 0 a post on t at carnes with 1t ce wt e y recogn uttes, such as a manager or treasurer. See id. § 27 ( ) cmt. a .  
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businessmen, the nature of the business and the customs and the usages 
within the trade can be important factors to be considered.380 
While the one-sentence commentary to article 302 1 makes no 
reference to the point,381 it seems beyond peradventure that article 
3021 was intended to provide a civilian-minted analogue to the 
jurisprudentially adopted common-law concept of apparent authority. 
The strength of this analogy remains to be seen. 
b. Putative Mandate: New Concept, New Questions; "Good 
Faith" 
The text of article 3021 raises at least two questions as to its 
reach. First, it states that it imposes contractual liability on a person 
whose actions cause a third person to believe that someone is the 
person's agent, provided the third person contracts with the putative 
mandatary "in good faith."382 Obviously, the key question is what 
"good faith" means in this context. As previously noted, the 
Restatement applies apparent authority on the basis of the third 
person's reasonable belief in the agent's authority, based on the 
manifestations made by the principal. 383 In this regard, 
reasonableness is an objective standard. As the comments to the 
Restatement indicate, apparent authority requires that the third person 
have both an actual and reasonable belief in the agent's authority.384 
If an individual has an actual, but wrreasonable, subjective belief 
then apparent authority is not created. As the quoted passage from 
the AAA Tzre opinion demonstrates, many Louisiana courts have 
recognized the reasonableness of the third person's belief as a 
necessary element of apparent authority. 385 
Thus, the crucial issue is whether "good faith" in article 302 1 is 
to be interpreted objectively or subjectively. The one-sentence 
comment wider article 3021 is, of course, as silent on this question as 
it is on any other of the many questions that might arise under this 
article.386 It may well be that the drafters thought it unnecessary to 
380. AAA Tire, 385 So. 2d at 429. 
38 1 .  The comment says only that the article is new and is based on article 2 1 63 of�e 
Quebec Civil Code. Nothing is said about the Louisiana jurisprudence on apparent authonty. 
See LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 3021 cmt. (West Supp. 1 999). 
382. See id. 
383. See supra text accompanying notes 378-379. 
384. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1 94, § 8 cmt. (c). 
. 
385. See, e.g., Boulos v. Morrison, 503 So. 2d 1 ,  3-4 (La. 1987) (refusmg to �ply the 
apparent authority doctrine because the third persons could not have reasonably beheved the 
alleged "agent" was authorized). 
386. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3021 cmt. (West Supp. 1999). 
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address the question of good faith because that term is supposed to 
have a well-defined and well-understood meaning in the Louisiana 
Civil Code. However, this question deserves more attention than it 
received from the drafters for two reasons. 
First, because the law of mandate overlaps with commercial law, 
there is an understandable tendency to superimpose on the former 
tenns borrowed from the latter. It so happens that in the area of 
commercial law, good faith is defined in subjective terms. 387 Second, 
even within the Civil Code there are different definitions o f  good faith 
for different purposes.388 For example, Civil Code article 487 provides 
that "UJor purposes of accession, a possessor is in good faith when he 
. . . does not know of any defects in his ownership."389 On the other 
hand, Civil Code article 3480 provides that "UJ or purposes of 
acquisitive prescription, a possessor is in good faith when he 
reasonably believes, in light of objective considerations, that he is 
[the] owner . . . .  "390 The latter article makes it clear that two elements 
are necessary for a person to be in good faith: (1) that a person must 
have a subjective belief that a certain state of affairs exists and (2) that 
person's belief must reasonable by objective standards. If either one of 
these elements is missing, there cannot be good faith.391 
For a variety of reasons, the latter definition, which requires an 
objective test, should be adopted for purposes of interpreting article 
3021.  Among these reasons are the fact that this has been the position 
of pre-Revision jurisprudence on mandate, the fact that 3480 is the 
more recent and more complete expression of legislative will on the 
meaning of good faith, and the fact that the obj ective test is the one 
followed in the common law states. 
c. Putative Mandate anti Agency by Estoppel 
A second questi�n raised by article 3021 is its effect, if any, on 
the status of the doctrine of "agency by estoppel" in Louisiana. 392 Jn 
387 .. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1 0: 1 -201 ( 1 9) (West 1993) (defining good faith as "honesty m fact"). 
388. No�e that this discussion relates to good faith in the sense of belief in a fact, as opposed to duties of perfonnance which are governed by other part f L · · I s L c c 
' s o ouis1ana aw. ee, e.g., A. IV. ODE ANN. arts. 1983, 1996- 1 997 (West 1987)· LA n�y ST···:r A-�· § 1 0: 1  203 (West 1993). ' . 1't • "' • "'-!'IN. • -
389. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 487 (West 1 980) (emphasis added) 390. LA. Crv. CODE�. �- 3480 (West 1 994) (emphasis added). 39 1 .  For an extensive discussion of these el · 
Property, 47 LA. L. REv. 429, 429-44 (1986). 
ements, see Symeon Symeomdes, 
392. For additional background on th" · 
79. 
is question, see Holmes, supra note 377, at 576-
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the older common law, differences of opinion existed as to whether 
apparent authority was conceptually founded on an objective contract 
theory or an estoppel theory requiring change of position.393 In the 
Restatement, however, the objective theocy prevailed, and agency by 
estoppel was defined separately in Section 8B.394 
As the commentary to the Restatement makes clear, while 
superficial similarities may exist between the two theories, apparent 
authority and agency by estoppel are conceptually distinct. Agency by 
estoppel is fundamentally a tort theocy, arising as a result of a 
misrepresentation or, in some circwnstances, a failure to reveal 
facts.395 It requires a change of position, however, to trigger liability, 
and compensates the third person only to the extent of his loss, defined 
as 'l>ayment of money, expenditure of labor, suffering a loss or 
subjection to legal liability."396 Apparent authority, as previously 
described, creates a contract binding upon the principal immediately 
upon offer and acceptance, without regard to fault or change of 
position. 397 
As to the Louisiana jurisprudence, however, confusion with 
regard to the two concepts reigned until relatively recently. An early 
393. See generally REuSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 180, § 23; SEAVY, supra note 
194, § 8; Wogan, supra note 340, at I I2-16. As these authorities suggest, it is easy to see 
how confusion about the doctrine arose. Both apparent authority and estoppel are based upon 
outward expressions of the principal and the reasonable interpretations thereof by a third 
person. In addition, in many cases involving apparent authority, the third person may have 
suffered a detrimental change of position. Thus, the two are frequently intertwined in the 
case law. 
Id. 
394. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 194, § SB. 
(l) A person who is not otherwise liable as a party to a transaction purported to be 
done on his account, is nevertheless subject to liability to persons who have 
changed their positions because of their belief that the transaction was entered into 
by or for him, if 
(a) he intentionally or carelessly caused such belief, or 
(b) knowing of such belief and that others might change their positions 
because of it, he did not take reasonable steps to notify them of the fact�. 
(2) An owner of property who represents to third persons that anothe: 1s the o�er 
of the property or who permits the other so to represent, or who realizes that th�rd 
persons believe that another is the owner of the property, and that he could �astly 
infonn the third persons of the facts, is subject to the loss of the property tf the 
other disposes of it to third persons who, in ignorance of �e facts, purchase the 
property or otherwise change their position with reference to 1t. . • 
(3) Change of position, as the phrase is used in the r�atement of tht� s�bJect, 
indicates payment of money, expenditure of labor, suffenng a loss or subjection to 
legal liability. 
395. See id. § SB cmts. (a)-(c). 
396. Id. § 8B (3). 
397. See Holmes, supra note 377, at 578-79. 
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Louisiana Supreme Court decision, Interstate Electric Co. v. Frank 
Adam Electric Co. ,  while applying an objective apparent authority 
theory, also spoke in terms of "estoppel."398 Eventually, Louisiana 
courts commonly described apparent authority as a species of estoppel, 
drawing no distinctions between the two.399 In the 1 989 Tedesco case, 
however, the supreme court made a limited reversal and suggested, 
without actually holding, that it would recognize a distinction between 
the two theories, relying upon the Restatement.400 At least one post­
Tedesco appellate case has applied that analysis.401 However, in a 
1 995 decision, Independent Fire Insurance Co. v. Able Moving and 
Storage Co. ,  the supreme court reverted to old habits, stating: 
Apparent authority is an estoppel principle which operates in favor of 
third persons seeking to bind a principal for unauthorized acts of an 
agent. When the apparent scope of an agent's authority, the indicia of 
authority, is relied upon by innocent third parties to their detriment, the 
principal is liable.402 
The Independent Fire case thus reinj ected a note of uncertainty into 
this aspect of Louisiana law. As one of the authors noted, one cannot 
determine whether the court was repudiating Tedesco, or merely 
citing the older jurisprudence in "loose dictum. '"'03 Further 
clarification has not yet come. 
The comments to article 3021 are silent on this question. 
Nonethel�s, it seems clear that, if courts desire to do so, estoppel­
based delictual recovery can still be recognized consistent with the 
new articles. Just as a master's vicarious liability for torts committed 
by a sei:rant in the course and scope of his employment arises from a 
tort basis rather than the law of mandate,404 agency by estoppel can 
398. 136 So. 283 (La 193 1). 
399. See Holmes, supra note 377, at 576 & n.33 (citing cases) 
400. See Tedesco v. Gentry Dev., Inc., 540 So. 2d 960, 964�65 (La 1 989)· see also �
�
�;:
��
��;:1�0coS:ieG�
f'!eiel�me�t
7
,
6
Inc.: Apparen� 1uthority Without D;trimental 
. . , · · v. ( 1990) (prov1dmg commentary on the case) For more discussion, see Holmes, supra note 377 at 577-79 B · fl · · · 
apparent authority claim failed, according to the c�urt b 
. 
th 
ne y stated, the plamtiff's 
of an immovable and the agent lacked written authori 
, eca�se e contract was for the sale 
court applied an agency by estop el theo th . 
ty: See id. at 577-78 nn.35-38. Had the 
not change position. See id. at f77_ 79_ 
1b e �amtiffs w?uld have lost because they did 
position on the theory. See id. 
us, e court did not have to take a definitive 
40 I .  See Everett v F oxwood Properti 5 84 
402. 650 So. 2d ?SO 752 (La 1995 
e\ . So. 2d 1233 (La. Ct. App. 1 991). 
For a discussion and critiq�e of this �ase s
) (� �g RESTATEMENT, supra note 194, §§ 8, 88). 
403. See Holmes, supra note 377,' at
e�79 
o mes, supra note 377. 
404. See supra notes 1 15-122 and accom
. . panymg text. 
1999] A KOMMENTAR ON LOUISIANA 'S NEW LA W 1 1 57 
also be justified as a particularized application of general tort 
principles.405 
Art. 3022. Disdosed mandate or principal; third person bound 
A third person with whom a mandatary contracts in the name of the 
principal, or in his own name as mandatary, is bound to the principal 
for the performance of the contract .406 
Art. 3023. Undisclosed mandate or principal,; obligations of third 
person 
A third person with whom a mandatary contracts without disclosing 
his status or the identity of the princ ipal is bound to the principal for 
the performance of the contract unless the obligation is strictly 
personal or the right non-assignable. The third person may raise all 
defenses that may be asserted against the mandatary or the 
principal.407 
In general, articles 3022 and 3023 complete the disclosed­
undisclosed agency puzzle discussed in connection with articles 
3016-3018408 from the standpoint of the liability of the third person. 
Consistent with the common law, article 3022 gives a disclosed or 
partially disclosed principal the right to enforce the contract made by 
his mandatary against the third person with whom the mandatary 
dealt.409 Article 3023 gives a corresponding right to an undisclosed 
principal,410 unless, under general obligations law, the obligation is 
strictly personal41 1  or the right is nonassignable.412 It should be noted 
that each of these articles makes a crucial unstated assumption-that 
the mandatary in each case was acting within his authority. 
Of course, following the supreme court's recognition of 
undisclosed agency in Woodlawn Park Limited Partnership v. Doster 
Construction Co. ,413 neither of these articles comes as any smprise. 
Perhaps the most important future issue relates to article 3023: 
Whether the jurisprudence interpreting that article may recognize 
exceptions beyond the two explicitly incorporated therein. For 
example, at common law, a contract made for an undisclosed principal 
405. See LA. Clv. CODE .ANN. arts. 23 15-2324.2 (West 1997). 
406. LA. CIV. CoDE ANN. art. 3022 (West Supp. 1 999). 
407. Id. art. 3023. 
408. See supra notes 290-329 and accompanying text. . 
409. Cf REsrATEMENT, supra note 194, § 292 (stating the common law with respect to 
a disclosed or partially disclosed principal). . . . 
410. Cf id. § 302 (stating the conunon law with respect to an undisclosed pnnc1pal). 
41 1 .  See LA. CIV. CODE .ANN. art. 1766 (West 1 987). 
412. See id. art. 1984. 
308 d 413. 623 So. 2d 645 (La 1993). For discussion, supra notes 304- an 
accompanying text. 
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is subject to rescission if (1) the third person was induced to contract 
by a representation that the agent was not acting for a principal and 
(2) either the principal or agent had notice that the third person would 
not have dealt directly with the principal.414 Likewise, the principal 
may not be able to demand performance if performance to him would 
subject the third person to "a substantially different liability" from 
performance to the agent.415 It remains to be seen whether the 
jurisprudence will treat the exceptions in article 3023 as exclusive or 
will, as has been past experience, continue borrowing from the 
common law. 
IY. CONCLUSIONS 
The above discussion attempted to provide the first assessment 
of Louisiana's new law of Representation and Mandate. During this 
discussion, disagreements with some of the new law's choices of 
policy or language have been noted. Some of these disagreements 
are minor, others are not so minor. Nonetheless, as stated at the 
beginning, the overall assessment of the new law remains decidedly 
positive. Indeed, the new law represents a vast improvement over 
the outdated provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 870 and an 
effective refinement of the jurisprudence interpreting, or ignoring, 
these provisions. 
At the same time, the new Louisiana law is a significant 
contribution to modem civil law in general and to the law of mixed 
jurisdictions in particular. While being faithful to Louisiana's civilian 
heritage, the new law recognizes the realities of contemporary 
transactional practice as well as the need for some uniformity with the 
law of the surrounding common law states. To that end the new law . ' has appropriately chosen to sanction certain useful common-law 
414. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1 94, § 304. This exception was noted in the 
Woodlawn Park opinion. See Woodlawn Park, 623 So. 2d at 647 n. 7. 
" 
It shoul� be emp?asized that the co�on l�w distinguishes between "better temis" and 
n? contract. !he �1rd person c�?t rescmd simply on the basis that, had h e  known of the 
existence and 1dent1ty of the pnnc1pal, he would have held out for better temis s 
REs'.ATEMENT, supra note 194, § 304 �t. (c). Th�s, the landowner who contracts to s�ll p� 
of his property to an agent whose undisclosed pnncipal was a governmental a t l 'ab'I' th' th h h gency canno escape 1 1 1ty on
. 
1s eo� •
. 
w ereas e probably could if the undisclosed rin · al hazardous waste disposal fac1hty. See id. P cip was a 
415 .  See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1 94 § 3 10 Thus a person · ti bl . . • · , agreemg to act as a surety or an o 1gation of the agent cannot be forced to act as surety c th · · I if . . al d ak ..&'. • ad LOT e pnnc1pa the pnnc1p un ert es peuonnance mste of the agent. See id § 310 cmt (b) Of · · 'bl th · ·1 J Id b · · · course tt 1s poss1 e at a s1mi ar resu t cou e reached by concluding that th · h · ' nonassignable as a result of the nature of the contract. See LA C C
e ng t mvolved was 
(West 1987). ' IV. ODE ANN. art. 1984 
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institutions such as apparent authority or undisclosed agency and to 
recast them in terms compatible with a civil code. Other civil-law or 
mixed jurisdictions that recognize the same need would benefit from a 
careful examination of the new Louisiana law. 
